UC-NRLF
$B 15 964

"TIN SOLDIERS"

WALTER MERRIAM PRATT

SIGILLVM · VNIVERSITATIS · CALIFORNIENSIS
LVX
FIAT
MDCCCLXVIII
EX LIBRIS

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

http://www.archive.org/details/tinsoldiersorgan00pratrich

"TIN SOLDIERS"

MILITIA MANEUVERS TAKE ON THE ASPECT OF REAL WAR AT TIMES

"TIN SOLDIERS"

The Organized Militia and What It Really Is

WALTER MERRIAM PRATT

Author of

"The Burning of Chelsea," "The Maritime Provinces as seen from an Automobile," "Through Europe on One Hundred Dollars," etc.

With Foreword by

CAPT. GEORGE E. THORNE, 24th Infantry, U. S. A.

Aide-de-Camp, Governors Island, N. Y. Officer in charge of Militia Affairs of the Dept. of the Eastern Division.

RICHARD G. BADGER

THE GORHAM PRESS

BOSTON

Copyright, 1912, by Richard G. Badger

All Rights Reserved

UA42
P8

The Gorham Press, Boston, U. S. A.

TO

THE PURITAN CLUB, BOSTON

among whose members are many officers in the different branches of the service and where an officer of the Regular Army or the Organized Militia is sure to receive a cordial welcome,

THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED

334254

FOREWORD

FROM the beginning of our national existence the militia has been very much maligned. This has been the logical result of our people failing to appreciate the true value of military training. Because the militia, lacking in organization, equipment, and training, with empty stomachs, and marched aimlessly about by *untrained leaders*, were not always able to withstand the onslaughts of a well-trained enemy, they were compelled to suffer, in addition to defeat, the further humiliation of being called by their unappreciative fellow townsmen, and even by statesmen in the Halls of Congress,* that word which comes so readily to those who have never experienced the terrible strain of battle — COWARDS. To say that these patriotic men who volunteered to defend their neighbors' fireside and the honor of their country were as a class deserving of such an epithet is preposterous. It was simply a lack of organization, equipment, training (team work) and qualified *leaders*. Only by such an explanation is it possible to account for the action of the men who fought in the battles of the first Bull Run and at Gettysburg.

The American people are rapidly awakening to the

*Report of the congressional investigation after the battle of Bladensburg and the burning of the capitol during the war of 1812.

true value of military training, not only as a means of national defense, but also as a potent factor in modern business. The time is ripe for a book which will create an interest in the militia — the men who have kept the military spark aglow — and which will place them before the people in such a light as to demand their respect and support. To do this without favor or hope of reward has been the author's avowed purpose in this most worthy undertaking.

Mr. Pratt has had considerable practical experience, having served in the cavalry, field artillery, and infantry branches of the militia, and at present holds a commission as first lieutenant in the Eighth Massachusetts Infantry. He has participated in practically all the large maneuvers during the last ten years, either in the line of duty or as war correspondent, and in writing this book has done his country the highest service possible by assisting in bringing home to our citizens the necessity of building up in time of peace an adequate national defense.

George E. Thorne.

Governor's Island, N.Y.,
4 February, 1912.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
Introduction by Capt. George E. Thorne, U. S. A.	7
Author's Note	13
The Tin Soldier	17
The Dick Bill	22
The Officer	27
The Federal Pay Bill	33
The Enlisted Man	38
Efficiency of the National Guard	42
Drill Regulations	47
The First Field Army	48
General Officers	48
The Mobile Army	53
Camps of Instruction for Officers	65
Schools for Officers of Auxiliary Arms	69
Strike Duty	71
Maneuvers	87
Pine Camp	90
The Massachusetts Maneuvers of 1909	91
A Militia Officer with the Regulars	105
Official Reports on Texas Maneuvers	140
Why the Texas Maneuvers were Beneficial	145
Appendix — History and Statistics of the Militia	167

ILLUSTRATIONS

Militia Maneuvers take on the Aspect of Real War at Times . . . . . FRONTISPIECE

OPP. PAGE

A Cavalryman making his Horse do Stunts . 18

A Militia Battery of Field Artillery at Target Practice 28

Rain does not stop the Maneuvers . . . 38

Ready for a Determined Stand against an Advancing Enemy 54

Organized Militia at the Great Chelsea Fire in 1908 60

Infantry passing, "route march," through a Village during the Maneuvers 68

Militia driving Riotous Textile Strikers out of the Mill District 76

Enlisted Men holding a Crowd of Strikers back while the Officers try to persuade Them to Disperse 84

A Company Wagon Ready for the March.

Five Minutes after Camp is reached the Cook Tent is up and a Fire Lighted 94

A Ten-Minute Halt is made every Fifty Minutes when on a "Hike" 102

Opp. Page

The Maneuver Division at San Antonio, Texas, in 1911 108

Sanitary Troops taking a Disabled Man to a Field Hospital.

Machine Gun Ready for Use 122

A Pontoon Bridge Train 136

After Marching and Sleeping for Forty-eight Hours in a Driving Rain these Militiamen are being issued Ammunition for an All-day Battle 150

Holding open a Railroad Line until Supplies have been brought up 164

AUTHOR'S NOTE

THERE is a tendency for one to overestimate the importance of things they are interested in and with this in mind the author has aimed faithfully to describe the militia as it is, mentioning both good and bad points impartially. The number of educated people who have a totally wrong idea about the Organized Militia is astounding. There seems to be no book in print which handles the subject in an elementary way, and it is hoped that this book will reach the general public and especially that class of people who delight jokingly to refer to the patriotic men making up the personnel of the Organized Militia, as "Tin Soldiers," and result in impressing them with the importance of the country's secondary defense. On the author's return from a tour of duty in Texas in the early summer of 1911, a series of articles was published in the *New England Magazine* of Boston, setting forth things seen and observed while with the Regulars. The interest shown in these articles, the request for further information about the army, and the author's desire to rectify the wrong impression many have of the Organized Militia is the occasion for this book. The articles referred to, somewhat abbreviated, form a part of this volume.

Statistics were secured from reports of the Chief Division of Militia Affairs, Upton's Military Policy of the United States, The State Militia Laws, Organized Militia and Army Regulations and Steele's American Campaigns.

The writer is under the greatest obligations to Capt. George E. Thorne and First Lieut. George C. Marshall, U. S. A., for information and assistance, and to Major Charles H. Cole, of Massachusetts, Capt. John J. Bolger, of Illinois, and Capt. Frank S. Elliott, M. V. M., to all of whom he is indebted for suggestions, information or pictures.

W. M. P.

"TIN SOLDIERS"

"TIN SOLDIERS"

THE American people as a whole know practically nothing about the United States Army, especially that part of it designated as the National Guard or Organized Militia, and it often seems that they care still less. This book is to treat historically and statistically of the Organized Militia, to show its present relation to the Regular Army and how necessary it really is, and correct, if possible, erroneous ideas many people have in regard to it.

Question the civilian and you will find he frequently refers to the personnel of the militia as "Tin Soldiers," and thinks of them as a lot of fanatics who are mentally unbalanced on this one subject, but when his life and property for any cause are placed in jeopardy and the militia are called out to aid the civil authorities in quelling the disturbance, nothing is too good for them. The press seems to delight in using the most potent of all weapons — ridicule — against them. Labor unions, in some cases, prohibit their members from enlistment. Some of the banks and factories, which would be and have been the very first to call for protection in times of disaster and disturbance, forbid their employees to enlist.

What kind of an organization, then, is the National

Guard? It is, generally speaking, a body of men devoting time and energy to the study of military science, who, it is not too much to say, show more practical patriotism than any other class of American citizens. Its members sacrifice time, money and pleasure to give themselves to hard and even, at times, monotonous work, that their country may have a secondary defense to back up its ridiculously small Regular Army. The National Guard officers and men of to-day are in a sense on duty all of the time but without pay. The officer retains his property, responsibility, and performs a certain amount of military duty. The enlisted man in the Guard is practically in the regular service, but on furlough, except that he also performs a certain amount of military duty. Like the regular, leaves and furloughs are revoked in case of war, and the "Tin Soldier" days are past. The utter lack of interest the average business man has in the militia, his own best insurance policy and the force that stands for law and order, is startling. It is the National Guard that takes hold, keeps order, and protects his interests when the local police are unable to cope with conditions, as at Chelsea, Johnstown and Galveston. As long as war, fire, flood and riot can exist, it is imperative that the militia shall continue, and it should receive the help and popular support it deserves from capital and labor alike.

The United States has only 72,500 men in her Regular Army, taking out sanitary and other troops, there remains only 45,500 infantry, cavalry and ar-

A CAVALRYMAN MAKING HIS HORSE DO STUNTS

tillery to form our entire "field" fighting army, and they are scattered about the Philippines, Hawaii, Alaska, Porto Rico, Panama and the States; but she has the National Guard, consisting of 110,500, for the most part, well equipped, physically fit, intelligent men, under oath to serve at the call of the President for the term of their enlistment, just as the regular does. These are what the unthinking and the unfair delight in calling "Tin Soldiers." The very man who jeers from the sidewalk as the militia passes could not, in many cases, pass the rigid physical examination required. Many point out with ridicule any unavoidable incident which occurs, and, although it may be unworthy of notice, or something liable to happen in any large society of persons, it is at once taken up if it concerns the militia, and is dwelt upon and augmented by the newspapers until the facts are so distorted that they are unrecognizable. A good example of this happened a day or so after the great Chelsea fire, while the city was under military control. Several of the soldiers took from the ruins of a hardware store, as souvenirs, scraps of iron which had melted and been twisted into odd shapes. A newspaper man saw a chance for "copy" and the next day a Boston paper carried two-column headings to the effect that the soldiers on duty in Chelsea were looting the ruins. There was absolutely not a word of truth in the article which followed. It was simply made up in the fertile brain of an unprincipled reporter, and yet the story was taken up as a fact by the press of the country.

The press never seems to miss an opportunity to make fun of the militia, but notwithstanding the unjust criticism of which they are the butt, officers and men obey the unwritten law not to reply.

With most nations military training is compulsory in America it is left to one's loyalty to volunteer, and it speaks well for this country that there are men who are willing to give their time, without pay, and in many cases with great financial sacrifice. Many of the officers of the National Guard are men of national prominence professionally, intellectually or financially. These men, in many instances, freely give every minute of their leisure to this government.

Since the early days of the Honourable Artillery Company of London, the oldest military organization with a continuous history in the Anglo-Saxon world, it has been considered one of the duties and privileges of high-spirited young men to give a portion of their time to training in the practice of arms. All great powers except England and the United States require compulsory military service. The doctrine that every able-bodied citizen owes some portion of his time to the service of the state is just and proper and means a safe and sane nation. A careful study of our history will show that the militia of this country has gone through five periods:

First. Merely citizens; no organization, armament, uniforms, equipment or drill.

Second. Trained bands; no organization, armament, uniforms or equipment, but a more or less

systematic period of instruction in acting together.

Third. The providing of some armament and equipment.

Fourth. The volunteer militia, with organization, armament, uniforms, equipment and drill; purely a state organization.

Fifth. Organizations of all states made uniform and subject to the call of the General Government.

THE DICK BILL

THE last great change in our National Guard development was the result of the passage of the so-called "Dick Bill," which required that the Organized Militia, in order to receive appropriations from Congress should have the same organization, armament and discipline as that prescribed for the Regular Army.

Under its acts and amendments the National Government provides arms, instruction and instructors, money to equip, or the equipment in kind to the extent of available appropriations, and participation with the Regular Army in field exercises of the Army of the United States of which the militia is now a part.

Before this bill went into effect, we had in the country at large, companies of militia varying in strength from twenty-five men to one hundred. We had officers who varied so in rank and duties that an officer from one state could hardly understand the organization of another state and even organizations within the state had different uniforms.

The Dick Bill has, therefore, created out of chaos an army of over 110,500 men (lacking to a large extent in field artillery, cavalry, field hospitals, ambulance companies, engineers, and transportation), and has increased the efficiency of that force for state service, and

made it available for national defense. Its national service is to-day given in the same manner that its state service was given heretofore. It gives the President authority to call into service a force which can go as organized; it gives authority for Massachusetts troops to be brigaded with those from Texas and California, under an officer from Illinois; or for a brigade from Massachusetts to be put in a division with a brigade from Pennsylvania and one from New York, under a division commander from the regulars, and with the knowledge that in so doing an organized fighting machine is at all times available. With this new national militia law the old "milishy" of the fuss-and-feathers period vanished. The annual "muster," as the week in camp used to be called, ceased to be a vacation at the state's expense, with lots of rum and little work, and the National Guard of to-day developed.

The framers of the Constitution realized that Congress should have the right to organize and discipline the militia, to call it out for preserving order, quelling insurrection, and enforcing the laws. The potency of the old ideas on state's rights and the disinclination of Congress to interfere in times of peace resulted in practically no action, and in times of war or pressing necessity the militia as such was seldom if ever ready for service, with the result that their record, generally speaking, has been a lamentable one whenever they have been used by the general government. This was owing to the faulty organization, poor equipment, lack of proper training and short-term

enlistments. In time of war it was found necessary to raise volunteer regiments in each state, in order that those state forces might become a part of a central organization which was the same all over the country. This therefore is what Homer Lee means when he states in his very remarkable book, "The Valor of Ignorance," that in time of war the National Guard would require reorganization. Although General Lee's book was not published until March, 1909, it was completed just subsequent to the Portsmouth Treaty and before the Dick Bill had become a law and revolutionized the militia.

The Organized Militia has been wonderfully increased in efficiency since the Dick Bill went into effect, but before it can attain its highest development as a part of our national defense it must be nationalized. No one to-day questions the loyalty of any state, its governor, or its National Guard, but in outlining a proper military policy nothing should be taken for granted. Governors and states in the past have not supported the country in some of its foreign wars — this might occur again. Furthermore, in questions regarding the proper training of the National Guard the Federal War Department ought not to be dependent, in making its plans, on the various ideas of our forty-eight state governors. Under the Dick Bill the President has the authority to call into the service of the United States the militia of a state through its governor. A governor can refuse to obey and the militia may refuse to answer a call not transmitted through

their governor. While such acts render it liable to court martial, no court has jurisdiction and no punishment has been prescribed. This should be amended so as to give the President the necessary power to enforce his authority.

There are some points of weakness in the Dick Bill that should be immediately strengthened by Congress; the word militia as used in the bill, should be so defined as to preclude any possibility of misunderstanding. The act of May 8, 1792, prescribing compulsory service in time of peace on the part of every able-bodied citizen between eighteen and forty-five should be restored. The Dick Bill repealed this act. A uniform term of enlistment should be adopted by all the states. It should be provided that no militia would be accepted into the service of the United States unless they have complied with the obligation to organize, arm, equip and be disciplined as is the Regular Army. The adoption of a universal physical standard should be enforced. A uniform system for the appointment of officers should be adopted. Election at any time is a mistake while the election of officers by their men in time of war in the field is a military absurdity.

It should be rendered impossible by Congress. For instance, how long would a department store be able to compete with its competitors if the managers of its departments were chosen by the popular vote of the employees? And what kind of managers would be elected? Would the most efficient, best posted, and strictest man be elected? No! it would be the easy-

going, good fellow who would get the job every time.

In the National Guard to-day there are many officers who, sad to say, are much too lenient and familiar with their men, simply because they are afraid of becoming unpopular and fear being turned down when election comes. This matter is a serious handicap to the Organized Militia and should be given attention for the good of the service.

THE OFFICERS

THE insignia of a commissioned officer of the Regular Service bears testimony to the fact that the wearer is not only an officer, but that he is also a gentleman, and there are but few places where he is not cordially welcomed and extended every courtesy. Under existing military, social and business law, an officer of the National Guard should stand on a similar footing to the officer of the Regular Service, unless he shows by his work or conduct that he is not entitled to that consideration.

Half a lifetime of conscientious work and endeavor is hardly sufficient to give a man the standing as a man of honor and a gentleman that goes with the insignia of a commissioned officer. It is the ambition of most men entering the militia to become officers eventually. Not until his ambition is realized does one comprehend the amount of time and study an officer gives his work.

For instance, in Massachusetts, on the election or appointment of an officer in any regiment, corps, battalion, squadron, departmental or personal staff, the commanding officer of such organization or chief of department forwards through channels to the Board of Military Examiners a report giving such information as he officially possesses as to the military, moral and

general qualifications of the officer elected or appointed; this report is filled with the records of the Board as part of the records of the examination.

The examination for lieutenant includes the following subjects in addition to a physical examination: 1. Infantry Drill Regulations, including — General Principles; School of the Soldier; School of the Squad; School of the Company; Ceremonies; Battalion Review; Battalion Parade; Company Inspection; Battalion Inspection; Escort of the Color; Manual of the Sabre. 2. State Militia Law, including — Election and Appointment of Commissioned Officers; Examining Boards; Appointment and Reduction of Non-Commissioned Officers; Enlistment and Muster-in of Soldiers; Discharge of Enlisted Men; Arms, Uniforms and Equipments; The Control and Use of Armories During Drills; Tours of Duty; Inspections, etc. 3. Field Service Regulations, including — The Service of Information; Orders; The Service of Security. 4. Manual of Guard Duty, including — Rosters and Detachments; Officer of the Day; Commander of the Guard; Sergeant of the Guard; Corporal of the Guard; Orderly for the Commanding Officer; Privates for the Guard; Orders for Sentinels on Post; Compliments; Special Orders; Color Line and Sentinels; Supernumeraries; Prisoners; Countersigns and Paroles. 5. Small Arms Firing Manual, including — Definitions; General Scheme; Preliminary Instruction and Drills for Rifle; Position and Aiming Drill; Deflection and Elevation Correction Drill; Estimating Distance

A MILITIA BATTERY OF FIELD ARTILLERY AT TARGET PRACTICE

Drill; Effect of Fire; Influence of Ground; The Employment of Fire in Action; Pistol Practice. 6. A General Knowledge of National Guard Regulations. 7. Interior Administration of Companies, including — Books, Papers, Records, etc. 8. General Knowledge of Ashburn's Elements of Hygiene. 9. Sherrill's Military Map Reading. 10. Moss's Officers' Manual. 11. Studies in Minor Tactics, Army School of the Line. 12. A General Knowledge of Regulations of the War Department relating to the Organized Militia; and Militia and Constitutional Law.

The law requires at least twenty-four drills a year for armory instruction, with sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of the enlisted strength present. At these drills the minutiæ of the drill book is taken up, especially those parts pertaining to the school of the soldier, school of the squad, and school of the company, this with a view to developing exactness and promptness of execution of the soldier, as an individual and as a member of the squad, and of the company; also, all matters pertaining to obedience, correctness of dress and smartness of appearance, and all that goes to make up discipline. All of this the officer must be prepared to explain to his men. If he is a company officer he must keep or help keep the following-named books, reports, and papers: a correspondence book, a sick report, a morning report, and, in companies supplied with public animals, a file or descriptive cards of public animals; also a company council book, a record and order book, an enlistment book or enlistment papers, a duty roster,

a property book or property cards, a first sergeant's book, and a company fund book, to be furnished by the Quartermaster's Department. On blanks supplied by the Adjutant General's Department, a complete record, description, and accounts of all men belonging to or who have belonged to the company, also a document file of orders and instructions received from higher authority and retained copies of the various rolls, physical examination of recruits, reports and returns required by regulations and orders.

The captain of the company is responsible for its appearance, discipline, and efficiency, for the care and preservation of its equipment, for the proper performance of duties connected with its subsistence, pay, clothing, accounts and returns. Officers in most states are permitted to attend and graduate from a Service School Course of three years, which takes up Military Law, Military Hygiene, Field Service Regulations, Map Reading, etc. They are also urged, and in some states required, to attend an officer's school held once a year at such place as the state may designate; this takes from three days to a week or more. Then comes the annual camp. Besides these the officers must plan athletic and social events to keep the enlistments up. Then there is the monthly officers' meeting at headquarters. From time to time the regiment is ordered out on escort duty. Then comes the company shoot, the regimental shoot and the state shoot and the preparation for them, and the captain must see that every man in his company has pursued the required

course in rifle practice. He is supposed to be present and pay his respects to the governor at all public receptions, is constantly subject to special detail and must constantly keep studying to pass Service School examinations. Then a good deal of time must be spent in playing the American modification of "The German War Game or Kriegspiel." But possibly the hardest work he has is keeping the men interested, getting them out to drill and keeping the enlistment up. Drill nights come around with startling rapidity and cannot be put off to please individuals, and often the work seems like drudgery, especially if a dinner or some other social function has been given up to attend. The man's friends tell him he is a fool to stay in the service, and often his employer objects. Is it, then, surprising that it is hard to keep the ranks filled. One of the most regrettable conditions existing in the country in relation to militia affairs is the attitude of labor unions toward the Organized Militia. It is well understood that these unions are, to say the least, unsympathetically disposed toward the Organized Militia. In many cases the sentiment extends to the limit of actual hostility and disbarment of members of the Organized Militia from membership in the unions. It is almost hopeless to expect any relief from these conditions by the enactment of state laws or any laws that would seek to restrain the labor unions from their unfriendly attitude. The most serious effect is, perhaps, that it operates to prevent many good men from becoming members of militia organizations. The

preaching of patriotism has no effect, and urging the fact that the Organized Militia has for its sole object maintenance of law and order has already failed to have any influence on the attitude of the unions.

THE FEDERAL PAY BILL

Says Private Pat to Corporal Bill:
"Let's go an' draw our pay
We've been marchin' in the mud an' slush,
An' sleepin' in the hay.
An' I've spoiled me shoes,
An' torn me shirt,
An' soaked me overcoat.
I'll be needin' several kinds of clo'es
When we're marching off the boat."

Says Corporal Bill to Private Pat:
"Ho! Pay is it! — See here,
You're not a major-general
Not yet a brigadier;
An' them's the only muts aboard
Wot draws Militia Pay,
An' you're lucky that you weren't assessed
For the chance to go away."

The civilian can be of great service to the Organized Militia by helping along legislature that will result in the paying of the officers and men in proportion to the time they give to the work.

The government must pay the militia if it wishes to retain a large number of the most desirable members. In Massachusetts and one or two other states the men are paid by the state for certain drills provided the attendance averages high enough. In most states pay is allowed for the annual tour of duty.

In most organizations of the Organized Militia it is customary for the men to sign over to the company treasurer the state pay for the annual encampment, to help defray expenses. With many organizations the men are assessed dues in addition so that it often proves expensive belonging to the National Guard.

During the past year the most important matter considered for the benefit of the National Guard of the United States has been the so-called Federal Pay Bill.

For a number of years, questions of vital interest to the National Guard have been annually considered in convention by the National Guard Association of the United States, an organization comprising representative officers of the National Guard of every state in the Union.

The Association met in the fall of 1910 in St. Louis, and authorized its executive committee, of which Major-General Edward C. Young, of Illinois, was chairman, to conduct an active campaign in Congress for the passage of a Federal Pay Bill, and although many other matters of the highest importance to the efficiency of the National Guard as well as the Regular Army were brought up and considered, the Convention moved

that the Pay Bill take precedence, and that the executive committee should bend all its efforts towards its passage.

For many years, the citizen soldier has given his time and his energy to winter drills, meetings for study and summer camps and maneuvers, receiving no recompense for his efforts. Company commanders have been forced to use the greatest diplomacy in handling their men in order that they might be able to keep a full enrollment, for an officer, to obtain rigid discipline and courtesy, must be diplomatic or he will lose his men or have a class of men in his company not wholly desirable.

Many officers who are young and enthusiastic, and who are willing to study and work hard for the interest of the service oftentimes become discouraged or disgusted over the lack of esprit de corps and either resign or do just enough work to enable them to hold their positions. The amount of work required of the National Guard officer has been steadily increasing from year to year, and at the present time, most states require their officers to attend a winter service school and obtain a certain standard of efficiency in examinations. They are also required to attend a summer camp school as well as an annual tour of duty with the troops themselves.

For all the labor outlined above, both for the enlisted men and the commissioned officers, they have received no federal pay, except in the case of the Summer Camp of Instruction.

In order to bring the National Guard up to the proper state of efficiency to conform with the Dick Bill, and to make our citizen soldiers sufficiently proficient and experienced to assume the field in case of necessity, it is obviously necessary that something be done and it seems fitting that our national government make some recognition for the work and service required. The only satisfactory way of doing this seems to embody itself in the Federal Pay Bill.

The executive committee of the National Guard Association used every effort at the last Congress to have this bill passed, and while they arrived at the verge of success, they were unable to obtain the necessary two-thirds vote of the House and Senate made necessary by special ruling. At the last meeting of the National Guard Convention held in Buffalo, N. Y., on October 9th, 10th, and 11th, 1911, the executive committee made a most comprehensive report which was enthusiastically received by the delegates present, numbering four hundred, and representing every state in the Union with the exception of Texas. The committee recommended the adoption of the following resolution:

Whereas, House Bill 8141 and Senate Bill 1996, being identical bills and commonly known as the "Militia Pay Bill," is the most important legislation ever proposed by this Association, and as the passage of this bill is absolutely essential to the further progress of the National Guard, Resolved, that this convention pledge itself, and the individual members thereof, to use their utmost endeavor to further its passage through

both Houses of Congress at the next session, and pledge their active co-operation with the Executive Committee.

The general feeling of the National Guard officers of the entire country seems to be that the bill should be passed by Congress, and if this very satisfactory solution of the problem is brought about the national government will control a body of citizen soldiery or militia who will have sufficient incentive to stick, thus producing a most efficient, able-bodied, and well-trained army ready for the field.

THE ENLISTED MAN

THE personnel of the enlisted man varies greatly; the reason for this is that on one hand there may be a company, battery, or troop with a waiting list from which the best men may be selected, while on the other a captain has great difficulty in keeping up the enlisted strength and is forced to take less desirable men. The advantage of joining the militia is not apparent to the average person; to those who have neither time nor inclination to look into the matter, it seems like a lot of hard work with no return. This is not true. The personal gain to those who participate regularly in drills, encampments and social affairs of the militia is great. It increases one's capacity both for ready obedience and for prompt assumption of responsibility. No lesson is impressed more thoroughly on the soldier than that he must not stop to argue a fine point with his superior officer. Quick action upon command is essential in a military organization. Ability to take the initiative means advancement. Every enlisted man is taught that whatever order is issued he must be prepared to obey without error or delay; it is his business to do the right thing at the right time. The average American youth is probably the most undisciplined civilized male in the world. It lessens his business or working efficiency seriously.

RAIN DOES NOT STOP THE MANEUVERS

For this reason alone, if not because of a real sense of patriotic duty, the father of to-day should make a serious effort to have his boy serve at least one enlistment in the Organized Militia.

The habit of unostentatiously and efficiently contributing one's personal services to achieving a big unity is attained by most men only as a result of just such training as a good militia company affords. One's connection with the militia gives him a local standing; it identifies one with law and order. Comradeship is promoted, there is no escaping the man with whom you march and bivouac. You come in touch with men from other walks of life, and are yourself broadened by the contact. The armories as now being built include bowling alleys and pool tables, and serve as clubs for the men. If a man is at his armory his family may feel confident of his welfare.

While motives of personal advancement like the foregoing may very properly influence the young man in joining the militia, his prime motive should be patriotic. It is not simply that one gets something from the service, but that one is also making a contribution to the common welfare. The advantages and the fun are only incidental; the duty is paramount.

Each man is provided with a locker. He is fitted to two uniforms, a Service (of olive drab wool) and a Dress (of blue). His equipment, if in the infantry, is as follows:

One United States magazine rifle, caliber .30.
One bayonet.

One bayonet scabbard.
One gun sling.
One rifle cartridge belt and fasteners.
One pair rifle cartridge belt suspenders.
One first-aid packet.
One canteen.
One canteen strap.
One set blanket-roll straps.
One haversack.
One meat can (used as a frying pan).
One cup.
One knife.
One fork.
One spoon.
One shelter tent, half.
Five shelter tent pins.
One poncho (rubber blanket).
One blanket.
One pair of shoes.
One campaign hat.
One housewife (needle and thread).
One overcoat.
One entrenching tool.

This equipment must be kept in the armory and ready for immediate use.

He must attend drills when ordered, qualify in shooting once a year, and be ready to report for duty when called. A record is kept in the armory of each man's home and business address, and nearest telephone and all other places he may be found, and frequent tests have proved that in most companies, a high percentage report within an hour from the time an alarm call is sent in.

The non-commissioned officers are selected with care and judgment; a man, to become a corporal or a sergeant, must have honesty, sobriety, and steadiness and intelligent knowledge of drills. He must cheerfully obey orders and be a man who can exact prompt obedience from those to whom he gives orders.

Officers and men of the Organized Militia, when called into the actual service of the United States, receive the same pay and allowances as the officers and men of the Regular Army. Pay commences from the day of appearance in pursuance of the call at the place of company rendezvous.

When any officer, non-commissioned officer or private of the Organized Militia is disabled by reason of wounds or disabilities received or incurred in the service of the United States, he is entitled to all of the benefits of the pension laws existing at the time of his service; and in case such officer, non-commissioned officer or private dies in the service of the United States, or in returning to his place of residence after being mustered out of such service, or at any time in consequence of wounds or disabilities received in such service, his widow and children, if any, are entitled to all the benefits of the federal pension laws.

EFFICIENCY OF THE NATIONAL GUARD

THE efficiency of the Organized Militia of the United States varies from that of a high standard to, in some states, a much lower one. The officers and men of some state forces know little even of their elementary duties. Through lack of interest and financial support in these states the officers and men do not receive sufficient encouragement to enthuse them to the point of giving up the amount of time to military study necessary to a properly instructed guard. Consequently they do not regard their military work seriously, but look on it too much from the purely social side. These states are getting fewer each year, they see the dawn of a new era in militia life, they are beginning to realize the time for play, carousing, and military "glitter" has passed, and that the states who look at the matter in a serious and patriotic light are in the majority. The incompetent and "unwilling-to-work" officers are being forced to resign for the good of the service. In the majority of states the work is a serious matter and the time and work that is required of the men by many states is getting to be so great that many officers and men find it a matter of no little sacrifice to them, their energy and their money to perform their duties properly as militiamen. However keen a military interest

they may have in their work, it is found often to be a matter that affects the interests of others than themselves in giving so much of their time, their energies of mind and body, and their means to this duty. In many cases some of the best officers and enlisted men have found it necessary to give up their connection with the Organized Militia because of the fact that, in their opinion, the sacrifices made were not justified with a due regard to the interests of their business or of their families. The United States should make payments to officers and men throughout the year that would fairly liquidate the obligation of the general government toward these individuals for the sacrifices made by them in preparing themselves for national defense.

Reports on the National Guard and comparisons of the different states are available and have a tendency to correct existing evils, for, as John Morris once said, "Our discontent arises from comparison; were better states unseen, man would like his own."

Most states have the right material but not the proper directing force.

The government supplies the equipment but the states must furnish a place to keep and use it. With the exception of a few states the armory facilities provided are inadequate, both for storage purposes and for drill. The instruction and training of the Organized Militia, involving the school of the soldier, the squad, and of the company — all that goes to make the individual soldier well disciplined, and the elementary

drill of the small military units to make the company compact and responsive to the orders of its captain in close order drills, and the instruction in the little things connected with guard duty and military ceremonies — must take place in armories. If the building is not built and used especially for an armory, but is rented for public and social gatherings of various kinds, the work of the company is seriously interfered with. A good substantial brick armory, with bowling alleys, pool tables, etc., gives the local company prestige, attracts recruits, and facilitates the work generally.

The mounted branches of the service are especially neglected. With few exceptions there are no armories for the mounted arms. The cavalry and field artillery have to depend upon public stables for horses, which are often hard to secure.

The small arms practice is given much attention. An army of men who could not shoot would be of little use. As a rule the American boy takes to shooting as a duck takes to water, and the opportunities which the militia offers for this sport cause many a good man to enlist.

About one-fourth of the government appropriation for the militia is expended for ammunition used in target practice; to this most states add funds, while in many cases company funds are drawn upon and individuals are often called upon personally to stand the cost of qualifying. Following is a comparative classification of rifle and pistol firing.

State or Territory	Expert riflemen	Sharp-shooters	Marksmen	First-class men	Second-class men	Third-class men	Fourth-class men	Fig. of Merit		Total firing, rifle	Total firing, pistol
								1909	1908		
Alabama	17	13	70	259	397	534	1,135	23.49	.....	1,290	.....
Arizona	24	17	90	20	18	51	366	32.87	44.09	220	.....
Arkansas	14	6	144	121	152	502	41	40.61	41.87	939	.....
California	50	9	827	162	126	319	1,335	40.91	50.80	1,493	228
Colorado	81	34	136	31	18	33	405	52.11	52.07	333	160
Connecticut	163	35	789	79	90	914	630	45.68	49.85	2,070	90
Delaware	18	11	29	8	15	152	141	29.17	10.68	233	42
Florida	12	7	67	48	47	186	760	15.94	11.01	367	4
Georgia	121	15	202	86	93	431	2,146	20.06	15.63	948	.....
Hawaii	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	15.92	.....	.....
Idaho	29	23	176	9	6	10	9	106.58	.....	253	23
Illinois	319	353	155	429	614	2,768	749	42.08	26.69	4,638	.....
Indiana	138	101	397	162	144	231	770	53.66	41.19	1,173	139
Iowa	263	184	1,077	184	171	351	805	70.43	74.62	2,230	108
Kansas	164	29	321	75	69	197	802	48.46	41.83	855	14
Kentucky	14	3	239	117	120	616	648	27.36	12.19	1,130	.....
Louisiana	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Maine	103	56	245	44	50	325	511	46.89	40.85	823	37
Maryland	230	26	1,062	64	61	225	367	81.67	85.98	1,668	128
Massachusetts	986	99	2,540	411	164	327	682	97.59	100.14	4,527	1,014
Michigan	184	69	379	138	163	1,149	591	43.04	33.73	2,082	32
Minnesota	106	92	720	143	171	409	883	51.65	55.74	1,641	112
Mississippi	17	1	79	187	229	56	803	27.32	8.59	569	.....
Missouri	87	20	298	199	211	562	1,891	24.52	27.17	1,377	.....
Montana	32	18	90	109	33	44	150	59.59	29.39	326	51
Nebraska	16	9	195	57	159	375	378	33.66	32.61	811	58
Nevada	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
New Hampshire	68	16	162	7	9	533	311	34.81	49.78	795	150
New Jersey	329	66	1,266	251	271	1,157	632	62.25	47.72	3,340	381
New Mexico	6	14	13	26	25	105	58	35.83	32.03	189	.....
New York	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	4,439	.....	.....	11,319	322
North Carolina	2	.....	161	201	326	944	79	33.46	14.85	1,634	55
North Dakota	35	12	82	52	65	141	220	42.11	35.42	387	.....
Ohio	268	115	1,938	489	503	1,496	499	64.32	45.05	4,809	427
Oklahoma	24	6	55	46	68	195	520	21.88	.....	394	.....
Oregon	119	80	301	85	91	288	359	60.32	47.74	964	72
Pennsylvania	1,029	143	4,042	1,872	1,422	537	1,976	76.97	68.78	9,513	969
Rhode Island	49	154	490	69	26	234	124	79.16	80.51	1,022	375
South Carolina	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
South Dakota	.....	.....	49	60	101	254	39	33.78	34.96	464	.....
Tennessee	19	10	234	132	195	472	380	36.80	16.07	1,062	.....
Texas	27	35	179	326	273	292	1,466	26.78	.....	1,132	.....
Utah	9	10	32	23	18	43	236	25.75	.....	135	.....
Vermont	25	14	321	72	52	105	186	62.26	29.86	589	.....
Virginia	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Washington	282	53	330	39	34	118	204	97.32	94.89	856	.....
West Virginia	21	55	528	144	120	197	305	61.33	43.94	1,065	29
Wisconsin	456	226	1,379	291	246	323	47	101.20	85.51	2,921	369
Wyoming	15	19	50	9	4	1	135	.....	76.22	98	.....
Total	6,107	2,288	22,795	7,378	7,227	18,406	29,746	.....	.....	76,009	5,471

When the small arms for which appropriations have already been made are manufactured the United States will have on hand 675,000 Springfield rifles of the latest model. The government had on hand in June, 1911, a reserve of approximately 152,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, less than a single day's supply for an army of 600,000 in battle.

DRILL REGULATIONS

THE War Department issued in 1911 a new book of infantry drill regulations, compiled by a board of military experts. The constantly changing conditions makes a revision of the drill regulations necessary every few years. This latest revision is of unusual importance. In the old book close order drill occupied one hundred and twenty-eight pages, in the new book it is cut down to fifty pages, and the space devoted to extended order, field service and combat has increased as much as the other has been cut. The day of shoulder to shoulder, rank behind rank fighting is over; this comes as a development of long range, rapid-fire artillery, machine gun and rifle, making tactics employed as late as the Civil War suicidal to-day. This long-distance shooting has developed long-distance fighting and extended order drill, evolving a new school of tactics. The experience of the British during the early period of the Boer War demonstrates the futility of these old-style tactics against an enemy using the extended order of to-day.

It is written with especial regard to the National Guard, the authors realizing we would never have a large Regular Army and that our drill regulations should be simple so that troops could be put as near as possible to a war footing without long technical training in the ceremonious details.

THE FIRST FIELD ARMY

IN 1910 the first definite step was taken toward combining the Organized Militia with the Regular Army in a tactical way in time of peace for mobilization for field service operations in time of war. The assistant secretary of war first enunciated the policy of the War Department in regard to this matter at the meeting of the National Guard Association at Boston, 1908. It is purely a paper organization and merely indicative of what might be done in case the President should call the Organized Militia of the states to the service of the United States.

Any general military system must rest upon the military division as the unit of organization. It is the lowest unit which includes troops of all arms and is complete and available for independent military operations. It is important that all concerned with military legislation, both civilians and soldiers, should have definitely in mind the normal composition of the military division.

The War Department has not at the present time carried the scheme of combined mobilization of Regulars and Organized Militia beyond three divisions, involving the states of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut and New York.

GENERAL OFFICERS

THE greatest weakness of the system is the general officers. There are a few notable exceptions, but take them as a whole they would render inefficient, through no fault of their own save inexperience, the best trained troops in the world. They are all estimable gentlemen, but tacticians, never—and why should they be? They are men who have spent their lifetime in building up their business or pursuing their professions. But you may say that they have spent a great deal of time on the military. Granted, but a great deal of the time so spent, as already explained, has been devoted to the business, social and recruiting end of the "game"—a most important duty, it is true, but one that leaves little time to study tactics and field administration. A general officer must be exceptionally efficient as his duties are exceptionally difficult. In the National Guard no general has the time or opportunity to obtain the necessary experience in exercising actual command over brigades or divisions of troops. It is rarely possible, except in the large states to assemble even a regiment for more than one week of the year.

The young men who enlist in the National Guard should have, when ordered into the service of the United States, the very best general and staff officers

that the country can produce. It is due to the mothers, wives and sweethearts of these young men, and they should demand it. If maneuvers are an indication of what will happen in war, the present system will certainly cause the "sheep" to be led to slaughter. We have spent millions in securing the conviction of worthless murderers yet in every war in our history we have cheerfully sent out our sons to be murdered by the thousands because of the inefficiency or inexperience of political generals.

There are two remedies, either of which would require legislation to put them into effect: first,— that militia organizations ordered into the service of the United States be limited to regiments, thereby placing the appointment of general officers in the hands of the federal government; second,— if the present plan of ordering out complete organizations, whether divisions or brigades, stands, that all the general officers be selected from the regular service, due consideration being had for officers who understood the limitations of the Organized Militia as well as its competency.

These plans, of course, are radical and would meet with a great deal of opposition. Before proposing them, it would be necessary to go into details. In civil life, in seeking an expert in any line, we go to men who have spent their lifetime in that particular line of work, as, for example, if we were looking for a man to act as chief engineer of a railroad, we would look among railroad engineers; if we wanted a man to take charge of an epidemic of typhoid fever in a town we would

expect to find such a man among the sanitary experts; if we were looking for an expert first baseman, we would expect to find him among professional baseball players.

The matter of reserving to the state authorities the right to appoint the officers after the organizations have been ordered into the service of the United States is wrong. The Organized Militia in whole or in part would be ordered out if necessary, to co-operate with the regulars. After all the Organized Militia is called our volunteers would be called upon.

According to the present law, officers in these three forces would take command in their respective grades according to the dates of their commissions, as follows: 1. Regulars; 2. Organized Militia; 3. Volunteers. In any case in which the Organized Militia is called into the service of the United States, there are going to be a great many resignations among the officers, especially in the higher grades. This will, of course, produce very rapid promotions in the militia and there will be, in spite of everything that can be done to the contrary, officers appointed to be colonels and general officers who have had very little practical experience. This was done in 1898 and we may expect that it will be repeated. These officers will rank, and therefore take command, over officers of the volunteers of the same grade, whatever the dates of the commissions. Many of these officers of the volunteers will be carefully selected from among the officers of the regular service, officers who have seen service in our previous wars, and it is not right that a militia officer of less service should

take command over them. For instance, it is perfectly thinkable that we should have officers of the Regular Army, who are graduates of West Point, the Fort Leavenworth schools and the Army War College, with twenty or twenty-five years' service to their credit, and appointed colonels of volunteers, who would have to relinquish command when in the presence of a colonel of militia, whatever the dates of their inspection commissions.

A partial remedy for the evil of giving militia officers command over volunteer officers of the same grade is to give both rank according to the dates of their commissions.

Any sane person will admit that general officers should be men of practical experience and until the general officers of the Organized Militia are replaced with officers carefully selected from the Regular Army, this will not be so except in isolated instances.

THE MOBILE ARMY

GENERAL EVANS, U. S. A., in his report of January 1, 1912, says that:

"Under the present laws the Secretary of War has not the power to dictate to the states the particular character of troops which should be raised. The most that he can do is to advise them, and, by pointing out their present deficiencies and showing the necessity for making good these deficiencies, to attempt to secure a properly balanced force such as would be necessary for active service in the field. It is thought that as a rule the sad results that would inevitably follow a campaign in which the Organized Militia participated as at present constituted are not generally appreciated by the Organized Militia. For instance, to push forward the large number of organized infantry inadequately equipped with field artillery, inadequately provided with sanitary troops to care for the wounded, inadequately equipped with signal troops to keep the parts of the command in touch, and inadequately assisted by cavalry, would inevitably lead to a misfortune which would draw down upon the military authorities the indignation of the people of the United States from one end of the land to the other. Actually, therefore, there is no part of the military force that has a more vital interest in

securing a properly balanced army than has the Organized Militia itself, and especially the infantry part. The Regular Army should be a properly balanced force; the Organized Militia should also be a properly balanced force. In neither case does the power to secure such a proper balance rest with the War Department. In both cases it can merely recommend to the proper authority that the forces be so balanced, and state the reasons why such a composition is necessary. In so far as the Organized Militia is concerned, the proper authorities to correct the present situation are the militia authorities of the different states and territories and the District of Columbia. Advantage is therefore taken of the present occasion to call the attention of these authorities to the absolute necessity of a reversal of the present plan of continuing to increase the infantry at the expense of all the other troops which are necessary to render the already existing infantry effective on the battle field. It is hoped that the statements which have been made herein as to the unwisdom of continuing to increase the infantry alone will be maturely considered by the state authorities and that progress will be made toward securing all the other troops which are necessary in order to utilize the infantry already in existence. It is not recommended that any existing infantry regiments be disbanded merely for the purpose of creating auxiliary troops, but it is thought that no further increase should be made in the number of infantry organizations and that all efforts of everybody from now on should be bent

READY FOR A DETERMINED STAND AGAINST AN ADVANCING ENEMY

toward bringing up to the proper number the auxiliary troops to support this infantry. This division can do no more than to place before the responsible authorities, namely, the militia authorities of the various states, a statement of our present situation; its remedy lies in their hands.

"Sections 5 and 7 of the act of Congress approved January 21, 1903, as amended by the act approved May 27, 1908, read:

That when the military needs of the Federal Government, arising from the necessity to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, or repel invasion, cannot be met by the regular forces, the Organized Militia shall be called into the service of the United States in advance of any volunteer force which it may be determined to raise.

"Section 7:

That every officer and enlisted man of the militia, who shall be called forth in the manner hereinbefore prescribed shall be mustered for service without further enlistment and without further medical examination previous to such muster except for those states and territories which have not adopted the standard of medical examination prescribed for the Regular Army.

"From these two sections it is apparent that in case of any emergency arising which would necessitate the calling out of large bodies of troops it was the intention of Congress that the Organized Militia should be called out either with the Regular Army or immediately

thereafter and that no volunteer force can be raised until the Organized Militia has been called into the service. It was undoubtedly intended that the Regular Army and the Organized Militia should be combined as one force forming the first line and that any volunteer forces that might be necessary should be organized under the cover of this first line. Such being the case, it is apparent that the Organized Militia should be in such a state of readiness, both as to organization and equipment, as to be ready for immediate field service. Whenever an emergency has arisen in the past necessitating the calling out of large bodies of troops the American people, with their natural impatience, have insisted upon pushing troops at once to the front without regard to the length of time that is required to properly prepare them for field service. Assuming that this impatience will manifest itself again, the Regular Army will be at once pushed to the front in whatever state of readiness it may be, and all deficiencies in men, equipment, and supplies will there be made good as fast as practicable. In the same way the Organized Militia will be sent to join the Regular Army after being reasonably but not fully equipped, and after arrival at the front its deficiencies will also be made good as rapidly as possible. The two forces — namely, the Regular Army and the Organized Militia, having come together, will then be combined into a single force as homogeneous as possible. The War Department has established the principle that the combination of regulars and militia in such cases shall be in the pro-

portion of one regular to two militia. Whether this combination will take place in divisions, brigades, regiments, or smaller units is not known, nor is it material to the present discussion what the combining unit may be. The essential feature is the assumption that there will be one regular to every two militia. It is not thought that a larger proportion of militia could, with safety, be combined with fewer regulars. In fact, considering the many deficiencies as a fighting force that inherently belong to a citizen soldiery when first put into the field, it is believed that two militia to one regular is the extreme proportion that can be adopted with a reasonable prospect of securing a fairly effective force, and that the proportion of one to one would be much safer, However, in this discussion we will assume the proportion of one to two for the mobile army.

"The scheme for the defense of the United States against an invasion consists, first, of the Navy, which must be free to take the sea and attack the enemy's navy. To enable this to be done a line is established, consisting of the coast defenses, comprising heavy guns, mortars, submarine mines, scout vessels, and various accessories, all intended to prevent the enemy's ships from capturing or bombarding seacoast cities or securing an anchorage in harbors and the establishment of a base.

"Supports are provided for the protection of these seacoast forts from attack from the rear by relatively small parties of the enemy while engaged by hostile

ships in front. These troops, designated Coast Artillery supports, consist of infantry, cavalry, and field artillery. They were unnecessary when seacoast forts were highwalled inclosures, with surrounding moat on the land front. The artillery troops forming the garrison were expected to defend the works from attack from all sides. To-day these "forts," consist of detached works, concrete and earth embankments, separated by considerable distances, and having a field of fire to the front only. Behind these embankments the guns are mounted, protected from the front, completely exposed from the rear.

"There are, of course, long stretches of the coast where there are no fortifications and where it would be perfectly feasible for an enemy's force to land. This force might, with the modern means of transportation, be a very large one and complete so as to conduct an aggressive campaign. For the purpose of meeting such a force as this the mobile army is intended. It therefore becomes important to examine into the composition of such a mobile army, which would be composed of the Regular Army and the Organized Militia in the proportions we have assumed — namely, two of militia to one of the Regular Army.

"The last reports of the strength of the Organized Militia show the following:

Number of mobile organizations in organized militia

Infantry regiments	141
Cavalry regiments	6

Field Artillery regiments	*8⅝
Engineer battalions	5
Signal troop battalions	12
Ambulance companies	†20
Field hospitals	†20

The militia of the Hawaiian Territory not considered. It would be available for duty with the detachment on foreign service.

"Since the bulk of an army is the infantry, the strength of this army must be used in determining how much Regular Army there should be to combine with the above Organized Militia; therefore, the above 141 regiments of militia infantry would require $141 \div 2 = 70$ regiments of Regular Infantry to combine in the proportion of one regular to two militia. This would give a total of 211 regiments of infantry.

"The basis of all organizations of armies is the division. This is the smallest unit that combines troops of all arms of service — namely, infantry, field artillery, cavalry, engineers, signal troops, etc. It is the smallest unit that is independent in itself. As given in field service regulations, the composition of a division is three brigades or nine regiments of infantry, one brigade or two regiments or twelve batteries of field artillery, one regiment of cavalry, one battalion of four companies of engineers, one battalion of two companies of signal troops, four ambulance companies, and four field hospitals.

"Converting the 211 regiments of infantry, the total

*Deficient 1 Battery.
†Not all organized, but personnel sufficient.

regular and militia referred to, into divisions, we would have $211 \div 9 = 23$ divisions, and completing the organization of the divisions by adding the other troops we would have:

Organizations in 23 divisions

Infantry regiments	201
Cavalry regiments	23
Field Artillery regiments	46
Engineer battalions	23
Signal troop battalions	23
Ambulance companies	92
Field hospitals	92

"Assuming that two-thirds of the above force is to be Organized Militia and one-third regulars, the strength of each in the above should be, disregarding fractions:

	Infantry regiments	Cavalry regiments	Field Artil'ry regiments	Engineer battalions	Signal troop battalions	Ambulance companies	Field hospitals
Militia	134	15	31	15	15	61	61
Regulars	67	8	15	8	8	31	31

"Accepting these figures as to what the strength should be and comparing it with the actual strength, gives us the following:

ORGANIZED MILITIA

	Infantry regiments	Cavalry regiments	Field Artillery regiments	Engineer battalions	Signal troop battalions	Ambulance companies	Field hospitals
Should be	134	15	31	15	15	61	61
Actually are	141	6	8	5	12	20	20
Deficiency	*7	9	23	10	3	41	41

*Excess.

ORGANIZED MILITIA AT THE GREAT CHELSEA FIRE IN 1908

REGULAR ARMY

Strength	30	15	6	4	3	6	6
Troops on foreign service	14	3	2½	2	2	2	2
Available within continental limits of the United States	16	12	3½	2	1	4	4

"If we now deduct this available regular army from the regular troops called for under this combining scheme, we have the following:

	Infantry regiments	Cavalry regiments	Field Artillery regiments	Engineer battalions	Signal troop battalions	Ambulance companies	Field hospitals
Should be	67	8	15	8	8	31	31
Actually are	16	12	3½	2	1	4	4
Deficiency	49	*4	11½	6	7	27	27

"To sum up, therefore, it is at once apparent that in combining the Regular Army and Organized Militia, and wherever one is in excess, deducting it from the deficiency of the other, we shall meet with the following deficiencies:

	Infantry regiments	Cavalry regiments	Field Artillery regiments	Engineer battalions	Signal troop battalions	Ambulance companies	Field hospitals
In the militia	.....	9	23	10	3	41	41
In the Regular Army	42	*4	11½	6	7	27	27
Total deficiency	42	5	34½	16	10	68	68

"The deficiency in cavalry would be further augmented by the necessity of organizing separate cavalry brigades and divisions in a force of this magnitude. It therefore becomes apparent that considering the organization of the Regular Army and of the militia as they are to-day and the proportion of the different arms existing

* Excess.

in either the Regular Army or in the Organized Militia, that a combined effective force cannot be obtained from existing organizations. This is due, in the Organized Militia, to deficiency in the field artillery, engineer, signal, cavalry, and sanitary components.

"Another way, and probably a better, to look at his question of combination, is to assume that between 450,000 and 500,000 men should be available for the first line of defense. These figures are regarded as reasonable, but must not be understood as in any sense representing the conclusions arrived at by the War Department. The figures are merely assumed here as a basis upon which to make an examination into the composition of such a force. Such a force would be sufficient to provide for eighteen divisions, two cavalry divisions, six auxiliary divisions, and provide separate brigades, coast artillery supports, troops for the line of communication, etc. If we analyze such a force into its components and select the mobile army part we would have a force consisting of:

Infantry regiments	190
Cavalry regiments	31
Field artillery regiments	44
Engineer battalions	27
Signal troops	27
Ambulance companies	89
Field hospitals	89

"The Regular Army and militia components of such a force would be

	Infantry	Cavalry	Field artil'ry	Engineers	Signal	Ambulance companies	Field hospitals
Regulars	64	10	11	9	9	29	29
Militia.....	127	21	33	18	18	60	60

"Comparing these figures of what there should be with what actually exists, we get

ORGANIZED MILITIA

	Infantry	Cavalry	Field arti'lry	Engineers	Signal troop	Ambulance companies	Field hospitals
Should be	127	21	33	18	18	60	60
Actually are ...	141	6	8	5	12	20	20
Deficiency .	*14	15	23	13	6	40	40

REGULAR ARMY

Should be	63	10	11	9	9	29	29
Actually are ...	16	12	3½	2	1	4	4
Deficiency .	47	*2	7½	7	8	25	25

"Here again it is seen that it is impossible to combine the Regular Army and Organized Militia in the proper proportions, because of the fact that neither is well balanced nor complete in the proper proportion of the components of a division. In the Organized Militia there is deficiency in all parts except infantry, and in the Regular Army there is a deficiency in all parts except cavalry. The problem of combining the Regular Army and the Organized Militia in the proportion of one and two can only be solved when each is complete in itself in the proportions of the different arms composing it. The manner of reorganizing the Regular

* Excess.

Army so as to secure such a balanced force as needed is one for Congress, based upon the recommendations of the War Department, and does not fall within the province of this division. In so far as the militia is concerned the matter is different. This division is the proper department to discuss the subject. In this report the use of the Organized Militia as a federal force is discussed, as it is believed to be the proper point of view from which to consider the question. As the federal government pays annually toward the maintenance of the militia over $4,000,000 from federal funds, it is evident that Congress in authorizing such a payment had in mind the use of the militia as a federal force. Yet as seen from the foregoing discussion, it is at present impossible to advantageously utilize it in this capacity, and the reason for this misfortune lies in the improperly balanced force that the Organized Militia has become. The number of infantry regiments has steadily increased while the other arms, which are necessary to render this infantry effective, have not kept pace with their growth. It is therefore apparent that at the present time all efforts should be devoted toward discouraging the creation of further infantry regiments and toward encouraging the creation of those other arms of the service in which the Organized Militia is so badly deficient at the present time."

CAMPS OF INSTRUCTION FOR OFFICERS

A SPECIAL effort is made to instruct the officers of the Organized Militia apart from the enlisted personnel. The only feasible way of producing any effect throughout the whole mass of the Organized Militia must be reached through a preliminary instruction of the commissioned officers. Schools for the instruction of infantry officers are annually held in the several states, for field artillery and cavalry officers at Fort Riley, Kansas, and for engineer and signal officers at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Arrangements are made for the adjutants-general of the several states and territories to assemble the infantry officers of their several forces during the early summer in camps of instruction for a brief course to be conducted by specially selected infantry officers of the Regular Army. This instruction is under the supervision of division commanders by whom instructors are selected for all schools of instruction conducted within the limits of their respective divisions. Transportation, subsistence, and pay of militia officers attending the schools are paid by the states and territories from funds appropriated by state legislatures, or from federal funds.

The courses of instruction of the infantry schools cover a period of from three to eight days. When

possible they are held at Regular Army posts, in order that the benefit of the presence of regular troops may be had. The division commander selects an officer in his division and details him for duty at his headquarters in general charge of all matters pertaining to the preparation of courses of instruction, selection of instructors, and methods of procedure in conducting the schools. This officer arranges with the adjutants-general of the several states and territories as to the place and time of the school and the period of instruction. The scheme involves the assembling of all company officers and battalion staff officers of each state in one or more camps; these officers come to camp with the field equipment of a private soldier as well as that of an officer. In addition to the elementary drill prescribed in the drill regulations, the officers receive instruction in such simple duties as the formation of a company, the care of the rifle, camp and police sanitation, first aid to the wounded, issuing rations, verification of issues, company savings, supervision of work of company kitchen, and inspection of meals. They also receive instruction in company paper work, including correspondence, morning reports, duty rosters, sick reports, ration returns, muster and pay rolls, requisitions for supplies, invoices and receipts, and reports of survey proceedings, exercises in giving command, instruction in military deportment, extended order drill, map reading, duties of patrols, advance and rear guard duty, outpost duty, infantry attack and infantry defense, and preparation of field orders.

Officers of the Organized Militia are supplied with specially prepared handbooks and other literature, giving instructions in the elementary duties of the soldier, in map reading, patrols, advance and rear guards, outpost duties, infantry attack and defense, and with a four-inch military map of Fort Leavenworth and vicinity, or of the surrounding country if not at Leavenworth. Advance guard and outpost duties are taught by tactical walks, the primary object being to explain to the officers how such walks can be conducted, by themselves, through the country surrounding their home stations, and to point out to them how, through the means offered by such walks in connection with map reading, a knowledge of the most important field duties of company officers and non-commissioned officers can be acquired.

Schools for militia infantry officers were held in the following states in 1910:

State	Place	Dates (inclusively)	Militia officers (students)	Regular officers (instructors)
Alabama	Pickett Springs, Ala.	July 5 to 9	55	2
California	Presidio of Monterey, Cal.	June 12 to 19	100	13
Colorado	State Rifle Range, Golden, Col.	June 9 to 11	30	3
Connecticut	Niantic, Conn.	June 13 to 17	86	6
Delaware	State Rifle Range, New Castle, Del.	June 6 to 9	20	4
Florida	St. Augustine, Fla.	May 16 to 20	90	4
Georgia	Fort McPherson, Ga.	May 9 to 15	150	6
Hawaii	Fort Shafter, Hawaii	Sept. 17 to 24	24	7
Illinois	Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind.	July 18 to 23	95	
Indiana	do	June 20 to 25	100	
Iowa	Des Moines, Iowa	June 14 to 17	151	8
Kansas	Fort Leavenworth, Kans.	July 10 to 17	72	5
Kentucky	Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind.	July 18 to 23	107	
Maine	Augusta, Me.	June 13 to 17	49	4
Massachusetts	South Framingham, Mass.	June 10 to 12	220	15
Michigan	Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind.	June 20 to 25	55	
Mississippi	Vicksburg, Miss.	May 23 to 27	40	5
Missouri	Nevada, Mo.	July 3 to 17	187	18
Montana	Fort William Henry Harrison, Mont.	May 2 to 6	42	7
New York	Karners, N. Y.	July 2 to 7	116	9
Ohio	Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind.	June 20 to 25	79	
Pennsylvania	Mount Gretna, Pa.	May 20 to 23	393	16
South Dakota	Fort Meade, S. Dak.	June 26 to July 2	3	6
Texas	Austin, Tex.	June 6 to 11	120	6
Vermont	Plattsburg Barracks, N. Y.	June 4 to 9	36	4
Virginia	Petersburg, Va.	May 26 to June 2	100	9
Wisconsin	Camp Douglas, Wis.	May 24 to 26	146	1

INFANTRY PASSING ROUTE MARCH THROUGH A VILLAGE DURING THE MANEUVERS

SCHOOLS FOR OFFICERS OF AUXILIARY ARMS

THE instruction of officers of the auxiliary arms, field artillery, cavalry, engineer troops, and signal troops has been along somewhat different lines from that for the instruction of officers of infantry. The relatively small number of officers of these arms throughout the several states and territories, and the difficulty of providing suitable school conditions at several points made it advisable for the instruction of field artillery and cavalry officers to be held at Fort Riley and for engineer and signal officers at Fort Leavenworth. The advantages of this plan were that the officers of these schools had presented to them the latest articles of equipment of the several arms and the benefit of the most competent instructors. They also had the opportunity to receive field-service instruction on the military reservations, under the most favorable conditions. The advantages outweighed the disadvantage of the additional expense of transportation of officers from their homes to the schools and return.

There is a wide variation in degree of instruction and scope of technical knowledge among officers of the auxiliary arms of the Organized Militia, and it is desired in these schools to provide, in so far as possible, for the needs of the different degrees of training and knowledge of the officers. Accordingly, the schools

are based on the fundamental principle that they should be divided into three periods of ten days each, with a definite educational objective for each instructional period. This feature fits itself to the different degrees of knowledge and training of the officers, and it enables officers who could give only ten days of their time to such instruction to make a selection as to the particular period fitted best to their own needs.

It is well understood that it is impossible, in so short a time, to train officers satisfactorily in field-service duties, but merely passing over the course with regular officers and having the advantage of seeing regular organizations actually at work and in action at Forts Riley and Leavenworth give a certain knowledge of the latest type of equipment and the latest methods of field-service practice. Having this knowledge, even though not proficient in the training, the officers have information as to what articles of equipment their organizations should have and are able to take up, in a simple way, of their own initiative with their own batteries, troops, and companies, such drill, training and maneuvers as they had seen and practised at these schools of instruction.

The schools are conducted during the months of May and June under the supervision of the post commanders at Fort Leavenworth and Fort Riley, to whom is due the credit of preparation of programs of instruction, providing all means necessary to carry on the instruction and a most effective personal supervision over the arrangements for receiving the officers and providing for their accommodations at the posts.

STRIKE DUTY

IF you ask a regular what he considers the worst kind of duty that can fall to the lot of a soldier, the answer will nine times out of ten be that it is strike duty, and nine times out of ten it is the militia that is called out for this kind of work.

Denunciation of the employment of militia for this kind of work is common in localities where the relations of capital and labor have become strained. In some of the southern and western states the militia have become quite used to being called upon to protect property and enforce laws for weeks at a time. As a rule they manage to suppress disorder without resorting to the use of the destructive energies at their command, and their record has been eminently creditable.

Strike duty is both dangerous and disagreeable. The militia must show patience and tact, they must watch and wait and cannot take the initiative; must keep their temper under a steady fire of vile names and derision. They must submit to being called cowards who do not dare to shoot, "Tin soldiers," "Two for a dollar soldiers," "Shoulder-strap murderers," etc. Soldiers on strike duty must be ready to face bricks and bullets in zero weather or boiling sun, and are not expected to open fire on a mob until one of their number has first been shot.

The writer spent twenty-eight days on duty during the textile strike in Lawrence, Massachusetts, in 1912. The first trouble at this great strike, affecting over thirty thousand workers, was on the morning of January 15th, at 6.40, the opening time of the big textile mills. Great throngs of strikers, who had been out several days, assembled in the mill section and began a noisy demonstration against the few workers in the mills. The cheering and yelling became so violent that mill gates were locked and barricaded. The strikers then began throwing rocks in through the windows, and soon pistol shots were heard. Crowds ranging from a few hundred to several thousands gathered in front of each of the mills and shouted, hissed and hoohed, then broke windows and finally, not being content with this, rushed the gates and entered the mills, where they cut the belts, smashed machines, and dragged the women operators by the hair from their benches. By nine o'clock the mayor admitted that the police were powerless to keep order, and signed the precepts calling out the militia. The members of the local companies (two companies of infantry and a battery of field artillery) had anticipated this action and were assembled in their armory and at once turned out. By noon five other companies had arrived or were on their way, and twenty thousand ball cartridges had reached the city. At three o'clock Colonel E. Leroy Sweetser of the 8th Massachusetts Infantry and his staff arrived, and took command of the Provisional Regiment of five hundred and two

men and officers.

He at once divided the mill section into two districts, divided by the Merrimac River and joined by three bridges. He distributed the companies about the different mills and placed each district under a major, making him responsible for what occurred in his district. The streets were cleaned out and certain ones were closed. When the crowds refused to peacefully disperse, force was used — and in some cases bayonets were resorted to. The determined attitude of the soldiers soon had its effect and the mobs became less hard to break up and arrests less often. As night approached conditions became normal. Strikers were in the hospital with bayonet wounds and about forty men were lodged in the police station. The prisoners were a hard lot, the lowest types of Italians, Poles, Greeks, Syrians, etc., and when searched nearly all had revolvers and knives concealed upon their person. During the evening six hundred Gold Medal cots arrived from the State Arsenal, and a supply of worsted caps, mittens and overshoes, all of which were issued before ten o'clock.

Each outpost was put in touch with headquarters by telephone; searchlights, sharpshooters and telephones were placed in the mill towers. A field hospital was established, auto trucks were secured for the commissary department and an automobile for headquarters. The week that followed was one of anxiety. The soldiers guarded the mill property, the police the rest of the city. Each day a mass meeting of from

ten to fifteen thousand was held on the common, followed by a parade, which at times would attempt to march through the forbidden district. Many times the situation was very serious, and but for the tactful, patience, great loss of life must have occurred, as the orders were not to shoot until it was absolutely necessary, but then, shoot to kill. Many heads were cracked open this first week, but not one dollar of damage was done to any of the mills guarded by the soldiers.

Up to this time the strikers had been led by a man named Joseph Ettor, of New York, a man who had figured prominently in frightful outbreaks in Brooklyn, Paterson and other places. He was now joined by the notorious William D. Haywood, who openly declares for violence, and other less prominent agitators. The speeches became more threatening and talk of dynamite and violence more open.

On the fifteenth day after the troops arrived a serious outbreak occurred before daylight and continued at intervals until night. Twenty-four electric cars were smashed, wires cut, people knocked down and beaten in the streets, windows broken, one woman killed by a stray bullet and a policeman stabbed. This disturbance all occurred outside of the military zone. More troops were ordered to the scene and arrived during the night, making twenty-two companies of infantry and two troops of cavalry; the local companies being relieved. The entire city was now taken over and placed under the nearest thing to martial law that the Massachusetts laws permit. It was divided

into six districts, each in charge of a major — and when the good and bad people of Lawrence awoke next morning they found guards on every corner and patrols on every street. The disorderly element resented this and showed fight. On one street they congregated and refused to disperse. Bottles, tin cans, coal and even iron window weights were thrown from windows, while the mob hurled ice, and some one fired seven shots from an automatic pistol. Something had to be done and done quickly.

The officer in command gave charge bayonets, and into the crowd of nearly a thousand went the little squad of sixteen men. Order was restored and the street cleared, but in doing it one man was killed; the only one killed by the soldiers during the strike. Not a soldier was seriously hurt, but when they obeyed the order to charge, it seemed doubtful if any would come out alive to tell what happened. Less serious riots occurred throughout the city that morning, and in every case the soldiers had their way without firing a shot.

Colonel Sweetser notified the strikers that he would allow no parades and no open-air meetings. Three men would be considered a crowd and all persons unable to explain their presence on the street before daylight would be locked up.

About this time Ettor was arrested as accessory to the murder of the woman shot, and held ten days for hearing without bail. Many arrests were made for intimidation, and during the third week four people

were murdered in the Italian quarter. While these murders could not be traced to the strike, yet it helps to show the conditions existing in the city.

During all this trying time the conduct of the soldiers was beyond reproach. Only two men were given leave from a company at a time. No man was allowed to drink or even enter a saloon, and the only two cases of drunkenness were brought before the summary court and the men were discharged for the good of the service.

Every attempt was made by the sympathizers of the strike to get the soldiers into compromising positions or incite them into doing some act that could be made capital of. Many attempted to give the guards whiskey and were promptly arrested.

Haywood, in his speeches, referred to the soldiers as uniformed drunkards, not worthy of notice, and said no meaner creatures lived, unless it was the detectives, forty of whose souls could be placed in the hollow of a hair. The agitators even attempted to place the blame for the four murders on the soldiers.

The following, which is attributed to Haywood by a Boston Paper, is typical of the attacks made upon the militia in the open-air meetings by the strike agitators:

"Soldiers and policemen are walking delegates of the capitalists; you never hear of a policeman beating a rich man. It is always the poor man. The policeman is a pimple and the soldier a boil on society. The soldiers committed murder in Lawrence; they put a bayonet through the lung of a mere boy. The

MILITIA DRIVING RIOTOUS TEXTILE STRIKERS OUT OF THE MILL DISTRICT

authorities say a woman worker was killed by a stray bullet from the ranks of the strikers, but she was probably killed by a bullet from the rifle of one of the sharpshooters sent down here.

"These miserable uniformed murderers, irresponsible, drunken reprobates, scabs on regular soldiers, with bared bayonets and loaded guns, are walking the streets of Lawrence without molestation from the strikers, who have learned to control themselves under our leadership. This is called the land of the free and the brave. It is the land of the capitalist, and Lawrence is the home of the slave."

The weight these and similar remarks had upon the country at large is illustrated by the following editorials and letters, the Lawrence *Critic* of February 11, 1912, in its editorial column says:

"Our thanks are certainly due the militia that for weeks have maintained order in our city, and above all have maintained order among themselves to the perfect satisfaction of the most fastidious of our citizenship."

"The 'boys' have performed a most disagreeable duty in the most gallant way."

[From the Waterbury *American*.]

"The Massachusetts militiamen are proving themselves a valuable and efficient force at Lawrence. The 'tin soldier' feature of the National Guard is considerably less apparent when the guardsman faces bricks and bullets in zero weather to protect property."

[From the Lowell *Courier-Citizen*.]

"That the 'tin soldier' idea has been effectually overcome in the state militia is evident to any one who makes the rounds of the companies stationed at Lawrence. Of course the military discipline is not what it would be in the regulars, where soldiering is the individual's business and his whole career, but considering that these men at Lawrence came out of all sorts of offices and workshops at short notice to do military duty as taught in the state armories and the state camps purely as an avocation, the discipline has been excellent. Not a few of the militiamen are almost untrained, being new members of their companies. 'Tin Soldiers' could not do what these men have been doing."

[Boston *Transcript*.]

"The situation in Lawrence is measurably clearing. The workers are going back to the mills in increasing numbers, and apparently there is a beginning toward a return to normal conditions. But it is only a beginning and must be carefully nursed and intelligently developed, else a speedy relapse is inevitable. The militia have rendered excellent service. We are proud of our state troops and have more confidence in the enforcement of law than ever, knowing what a splendid dependence we have in case of emergency. But while it is undeniably too soon to permit their withdrawal, with opportunity to return to their homes and their business, preparation for that step should be

in progress and to this end the city of Lawrence should rise to a clearer sense of its responsibility than it has yet manifested.

"It has been a period of unwonted hardship for the soldiers. The kind of service has been very unpleasant, the weather has added to the discomforts and most all are losing money through this service to the state. But they have displayed admirable patience, self-restraint and loyalty. To such an extent do they deserve the gratitude of the city they have protected that it should be doubly alert to take such measures in its own behalf as would most quickly give them their release. Money should not count in this matter,"

[From the Boston *Herald.*]

"If such services as the militia is now performing at Lawrence had been in evidence at the time of the enactment of the 'pay bill' by the last Legislature, that measure would have had a far less stormy course.

"The public now has occasion to realize that the militia is as much of a necessity as the police force. Both should be maintained at a high standard. The kind of duty in which the militia is now engaged is quite as distasteful as any that can be asked, particularly of workingmen. And yet they are performing it as becomes good soldiers. Had it not been for their presence in Lawrence the past two weeks, mill property to the value of millions would have been destroyed, entailing a burden on the taxpayers for years to come.

"The rule of the mob came to an end when what was, in effect, martial law was extended through the city."

A letter from A. B. Henderson, of Greenfield, Mass.

"A short time ago the *Herald* published an editorial dealing with the valuable work the militia was performing in Lawrence, and complimenting the citizen soldiery for the part they had thus far played in preserving order among the striking textile workers.

"In these days of seemingly continual industrial strife, the organized militia is indeed grateful to its sympathetic friends who are always ready to sound a note of praise in their behalf.

"It is safe to say that the militia is the only real practical patriotic body of men in the country to-day. Other organizations may hold meetings and discuss things of a patriotic nature, but this does not class with the work that the militia is performing. Here is a body of men, serving without pay, enduring all sorts of attacks from labor organizations and outsiders in general; who are engaged mainly in one thing, namely, to volunteer their services to their country in time of need, and who never have received proper credit from the majority of American citizens. Is it any disgrace to wear the uniform of your country and march beneath your country's flag? Then why should true Americans heap such ridicule as labor organizations have upon the militia."

[W. C. Taylor in the Boston *Herald.*]

"Any attempt to discredit the state troops or the

soldiers of the United States ought to be resented by every law-abiding citizen.

"No honest man, in pursuit only of his lawful business or employment, ever had to face a line of soldiers in this country. They are never called out except to prevent crime, and nobody but criminals has anything to fear from them. These are plain, cold truths which will stand every test, from every angle.

"The troops at Lawrence have not hindered any honest man from his lawful business. No troops have ever done that anywhere in America. They have, however, at various times prevented crime and interfered with assault, arsen and general riot. They are necessary guards in any civilized state, and they are entitled to honor and respect as part of the government. This being the case, there is neither point nor purpose to the Swift arraignment of Harvard. I never even set foot within the walls of a Harvard edifice, and am, therefore, not an interested partisan. I take it for granted that if this country were threatened by a foreign enemy Harvard would furnish a quota of defenders; they would be honored as such; and the same kind of honor is due those who act as defenders from internal enemies. It is about time the disparagers of American soldiers were properly classified and labeled. They are enemies of the nation, for the soldiers are the nation's right arm."

From *Fibre and Fabric*, March 1.

"If the public knew just what a problem the police and soldiers were dealing with in Lawrence they would take an entirely different view of the situation. The women are the most serious problem confronting the men who are stationed in Lawrence to keep peace and prevent destruction of mill property.

"If the women strikers are handled roughly, then there is a howl from the press, none too friendly to the manufacturing interests but what is to be done when a mob of women are pushed to the front for a second section of peace disturbers to hide behind? The women can resist the officers, throw pepper in their eyes and perform a few such gentle acts, and if any of them, refusing to disperse, are mussed up, then come new investigations, both by the state and the national government. If the women strikers are willing tools of the strike leaders, they must expect to get their heads cracked, and the conditions fully justify the drastic measures taken by the guardians of the peace so far, and it is wonderful how well these policemen and soldiers have conducted themselves while preventing serious disorder.

"The most creditable feature of the Lawrence trouble is the careful manner in which the police and soldiers have conducted themselves. Their patience and skill in preventing bloodshed should have the hearty commendation of press and public. Take it home and reason out the situation; — a mob of ig-

norant women pushed to the front by men who are a menace to civilization, throwing pepper and stones, sticks or anything handy. Then reason out how it would affect one's nerves to feel that about every house passed in certain sections concealed men and women with guns, ready to shoot. It requires cool heads, under such circumstances, to prevent hundreds of funerals in the city of Lawrence."

These and hundreds of similar articles appeared during the strike. The headlines in the papers from day to day, the first few weeks, tell the story of strike duty well and briefly.

Jan. 15. Militia Called Out.
Three Companies of Militia out in Lawrence Strike.
Troops Charge Lawrence Strikers with Fixed Bayonets.
Lawrence Guarded by Armed Men.

Jan. 16. Lawrence under the Protection of 500 Mass. Militia.
Bayonets of State Troops Quell Riots.
Militia Quells Mob of Foreign Operatives.

Jan. 17. Officials Try and End Trouble while State Troops Keep Peace.
Troops in Control.

Jan. 18. Heads Broken when Battery Holds up Mob.
Militia Scatters Crowd.
Parade of Six Thousand Strikers Flee before Bayonets.

Jan. 19. Rioters Quit in Fear of Militia.
Strikers Say They Are Opposed to Violence.
Jan. 20. Three Thousand Strikers March on Soldiers.
Bloodshed Narrowly Averted by Good Judgment of Militia Officers.
Jan. 21. The Strikers Condemn Alleged Action of Militiamen.
Haywood Threatens to Stop Freighting.
The City to be put in Darkness.
Jan. 22. Dynamite Found in Oak Street House.
Ettor Defies Mill Owners.
Pickets Stab Watchman.
Jan. 23. Soldiers Suffer with Cold.
More Explosives Unearthed.
Jan. 24. Soldiers Make Arrests for Intimidation.
Police Trail Professional Bad Men.
Jan. 25. Saloons Closed.
Strikers in Fight to Win.
Jan. 26. Practically Every Mill is Closed.
Militiamen Face Duty Philosophically.
Jan. 27. Bayonets Bar Path of Big Parade.
No Violence Used.
Jan. 28. Trouble Looked For.
Strikers to Make Big Demonstration.
Jan. 29. Strikers in Wild Riot at Lawrence.
Electric Cars Smashed. Many Hurt.
Woman Killed and Policeman Stabbed.
Jan. 30. Bullets Fly and Mill Strikers out in Riots.
Maddened Mob of Six Thousand Defies all Authority.

ENLISTED MEN HOLDING A CROWD OF STRIKERS BACK WHILE THE OFFICERS TRY TO PERSUADE THEM TO DISPERSE

More Troops Rushed to City.
Jan. 31. One Rioter Killed by Bayonet.
Martial Law Practically Rules Lawrence.
Entire City Now to be Patrolled.
Feb. 1. Ettor Arrested, Accessory to Murder.
First Shot Fired by Soldiers.
Attempt Made to Rush Mill Across Ice.
No Parades or Meetings to be Allowed.
Feb. 2. Four Murdered in Lawrence Home.
Great Crowd Collects and Militia are Sent to Clean the Street.

It seems to be the universal opinion that the militia handled the Lawrence strike remarkably well. No doubt the strike leaders hoped they would use slam-bang methods and by so doing keep the strikers in a state of excitement.

Colonel Sweetser was not that kind of a man: — a judge, a capable lawyer, a good soldier, he had all the qualifications needed, and the result was that by tact and diplomacy, order was maintained with little bloodshed. Colonel Sweetser showed the strikers they would be given a fair show. He listened to their leader and told him what he could do and what he could not do. He said to Mr. Ettor on the morning of January 19th, at the Franco-Belgium Hall, "I am in command of the soldiers, and am responsible to my commanding officer for what they do. You, Mr. Ettor, are the leader of the strikers, and I shall hold you strictly responsible for anything that occurs." Mr. Ettor assumed this responsibility in the presence of the writer as a witness.

Colonel Sweetser next showed the strikers that while the soldiers did not want to shoot they were not afraid to do so if necessary, and when they did, it would not be over the mob's heads.

At first the soldiers were insulted, called vile names and booh-ed at when on the street, but before they were in Lawrence three weeks they were being saluted and shown respect by all but the professional agitators.

MANEUVERS

JOINT encampment of the Organized Militia with the regular troops are held during the summer and early fall at ten different localities, namely: Pine Camp, Jefferson County, New York; Gettysburg, Pennsylvania; Chickamauga Park, Georgia; Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana; Fort Riley, Kansas; near Fort D. A. Russell, Iron Mountain, Wyoming; Sparta, Wisconsin; Leon Springs, Texas; American Lake, Washington; Atascadero, California, and a joint camp of instruction for field artillery at Sparta, Wisconsin.

Joint coast-defense exercises are held in all the coast artillery districts.

The benefit a militia officer receives from attending these schools, is just the benefit an amateur derives in watching a professional in his own line of work at his trade. A college baseball team may play a great game of ball. The Harvard or Yale team, for instance, may know the history and theory of the game as well as the professional, but put them together and the college team will profit by the experience. The theory on which the federal and the state governments are working is to give the militia the greatest degree of military field efficiency possible with the limited amount of time and money.

There are two ways of becoming efficient; one is to learn by experience in service, the other is through the example of the efficient. The officers' schools teach how to live, march and fight; in other words, the proper clothing, quarters and food, how to pack a load, regulate a day's work and protect the feet, and how to shoot. The officer must know these things in order that his men may learn from him.

The most important maneuvers have been the Manassas, Virginia Maneuvers, of 1904; those of Pine Camp, New York, 1908; the Massachusetts Maneuvers of 1909; those in Texas in 1911, and the Massachusetts Maneuvers of 1911, the latter important, as they constituted a new department for state troops, being the first maneuvers of their character ever attempted by a single state. The state forces were divided into two brigades which fought out a problem over Middlesex and Essex counties; they were on the march the entire ten days of their tour of duty.

The improvement in the National Guard has been very marked since the joint maneuvers in Virginia. At that time it was apparent that insufficient attention had been given to personal hygiene and field work. In outpost duty, patrol duty, and advance and rear guard duty the militia was weak. The shoes were poor, the equipment, generally speaking, incomplete, and it was easy to find any number of military absurdities. Since the Manassas Maneuvers the Organized Militia has steadily progressed in effi-

ciency. It has worked hard along the most practical lines and in some states has become a well-organized, well-equipped and efficient military body.

Just as the armory work, with its close order drills and lectures, is necessary, so are maneuvers where the men can work out problems they have been taught in theory. The work in the field for the militiaman is hard, at times even severe. Digging trenches, "hiking" through miles of tangled woods and swamps in rain or heat, sleeping on the ground and eating army rations, shows what's in a man, and rids the militia of the quitters. Men who go into soldiering have got to face some strenuous times. They cannot learn how to take care of themselves in the cold and rain, heat and dust, in armories, or the old-fashioned "milishy" camps. The men must know how to meet the requirements of the march, bivouac, and combat and how to care for themselves under service conditions. These constitute the only objects of military training, nothing else is of any importance, except as it contributes to efficiency along these lines. Hence the great importance of maneuvers. To make a practical soldier you must get him into the field and make him work out familiar things in unfamiliar surroundings. One week of daily practice in the field, I do not hesitate to say, is worth six months' work in the armory.

All of this field work helps to make strong men with red blood in their veins. It teaches the men to take care of themselves and trains officers in estimating tactical situations and giving field orders.

PINE CAMP

DURING the summer of 1908 the government started a Camp of Instruction at Pine Camp, in Jefferson County, New York, and has since held joint maneuvers every two years for the Army and Organized Militia. The camp is located two miles from the railroad station on a gently rolling plateau of sand, partly open and partly covered with a growth of pine and other small scrubby trees. The camp is two hundred feet above the Black River, about half a mile away. The camp of 1908 was the first joint camp held after the Dick Bill became a law, and for this reason, if for no other, attracted wide attention. Major-General Frederick D. Grant was the commanding officer. The drills were mostly in extended order and field exercises. A non-commissioned officers' school was held after the different problems and talks were given the men by the officers. The militia officers were given talks each day by regular officers on advance, rear and flank guards, patrols, field orders, marches, outpost and reconnoissance attack and defense, and in the evening regular and militia officers attended lectures, at Division Headquarters, on camp sanitation, on the effect of artillery fire, on the attack and defense of convoys and on the Russian-Japanese War.

THE MASSACHUSETTS MANEUVERS OF 1909

THE so-called "Massachusetts Maneuvers" took place the year following the Camp of Instruction at Pine Camp. Never before in the history of this country have joint military maneuvers been held in time of peace of the magnitude of those which took place from August 14th to 21st, 1909, in Southern Massachusetts.

Never before has so much time and money been expended by the government. Never have the citizens of any district shown more interest in military affairs, and never in history have plans been kept so secret from citizens and soldiers alike.

It was the first time in the history of military maneuvers in this country that transports were used and no permanent camps were made. The maneuvers were of sufficient importance for foreign nations to send military attaches, and the interest the entire country manifested was shown by the fact that over two hundred and fifty newspaper representatives accompanied the troops.

For weeks before the maneuvers commenced the papers contained columns of contradictory information, the only official information given to the press was the date. Even the officers of various outfits did not know where they were to be sent until some forty-eight hours before their departure.

They were told that they were to defend Boston. The assumed situation was that war had been declared between the United States and a foreign power. The Navy was supposed to have been either defeated or else lured away from the neighborhood of Massachusetts.

The War Department had received information that a fleet of transports, escorted by a naval force, was approaching New England bringing ten thousand troops with the idea of seizing the forts of Boston from the land and that the objective point of the transports was somewhere from Buzzards Bay to Salisbury Beach.

The object of the maneuvers was to show just how hard or easy it would be for invaders to land from transports and push forward inland for the capture of Boston as a basis of supplies, and to determine, if possible, whether it was imperative that more coast batteries and men be added to the Massachusetts coast.

The defense of Boston was given over to the Massachusetts militia, with the general officers of the National Guard in command, while the invaders were commanded by regular army officers.

The maneuvers were in charge of General Leonard Wood and General Witherspoon of the U. S. Army, with Brig.-Gen. Wm. A. Pew, Jr., M. V. M., in command of the defense; Brig.-Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, head of the Army War College in Washington, in command of the invading force.

Under General Pew there were the 2d, 5th, 6th, 8th and 9th regiments of Infantry, the Corps of Coast

Artillery, the two battalions of Cadets, a squadron of Cavalry, a battalion of Field Artillery, and the Signal and Sanitary troops consisting of one company each.

The invading forces consisted of the District of Columbia, 1st Field Battery, 1st and 2d Regiments Infantry, 1st separate Battalion of Infantry (colored), Ambulance and Signal Corps. Connecticut 1st and 2d Regiment Infantry, Troop A, Battery A and a Signal Corps. The New York 7th and 14th Regiments Infantry, 22d Regiment of Engineers, Squadron A, 1st and 2d Company Signal Corps, 1st, 2d and 3d Battery of Field Artillery. The New Jersey Squadron of Cavalry and the 10th U. S. Cavalry (colored), the latter famous for their work at San Juan and in the Philippines.

Before the maneuvers, criticism was expressed by the general public at the War Department for ordering the militia on so strenuous a tour. Said they, "it is absurd to expect citizen soldiers to go from the offices and workshops into the field and rough it with the regulars." But no complaints were heard from the citizen soldier; he was pleased and keen about going, and as the time drew near became impatient to start. So enthusiastic were most that they gave up Saturdays and Sundays for weeks before the appointed date, and companies of infantry could be seen on practice marches everywhere. The men themselves trained and did what they could to get in the best physical condition, for they knew the maneuvers would involve

miles of marching over fields, through meadows, swamps and forests with sandy soil or mud to make it harder. These maneuvers would have been impossible a few years before. But the second line of defense, as the regulars now term the National Guard, is a very different proposition from the militia of old. In the olden days muster, as it was then called, was nothing but a week's vacation. To-day it is work, work, work, and then more work.

In the olden days enlisted men took along trunks filled with fancy uniforms, cot beds, a case or two of beer and, possibly, a man to do the dirty work. In those days there were tents to sleep in and the meals were served in a mess hall, dress parades were held and lady friends attended. How different it is to-day. An enlisted man takes one uniform, usually made of khaki, which he wears. He camps where he happens to be at night, sleeps in his clothes on the ground with nothing but a rubber blanket for a mattress. He may be covered by a Pup tent, but more often, only by the sky. Everything he takes is carried on his back. Instead of dress parades and drills, with galleries of admiring women, he has sham battles and outpost work. Instead of mess halls, with an elaborate bill of fare, he sits on the ground and eats haversack rations, which consist of bacon, hard bread, coffee roasted and ground, sugar, salt, black pepper, or, may only get an emergency ration.

Before the Dick Bill went into effect a large percentage of the enlisted men would have been unable to

A COMPANY WAGON READY FOR THE MARCH

THE COOK TENT IS UP AND THE FIRE GOING FIVE MINUTES AFTER CAMP IS REACHED

participate in so strenuous a campaign if for no other reason than their physical condition.

The physical examinations to-day are strict, come at frequent intervals, and are carried out to the letter, as the writer can bear witness after being turned down by the examining board on account of varicose veins, and staying in the hospital five weeks having them cut out. Under the new law the government appropriates more money and expects more work of the men.

The maneuvers were not, as many supposed, for the purpose of hardening the militiamen to campaign work. The principal object, as already stated, was to test the defense of the Massachusetts coast, but, secondly, they were to accustom the officer from the highest to the lowest rank to handle large masses of men. The increase of men under an officer's control tests his ability and quickly shows the line at which he ceases to be an effective commander.

The maneuvers were largely devised for the purpose of bringing officers face to face with conditions involving the handling of large bodies of men, and the results achieved showed that certain officers were qualified for advancement while some commanded as many men as they would ever be capable of handling. They were of especial value to the commissary and quartermaster departments. The test was a severe one but proved that, with an occasional exception, these departments were commanded by efficient men.

Although the maneuvers were only from the fourteenth to the twenty-first of August, many of the troops

were on duty ten to fourteen days. The 10th Cavalry left Fort Ethan Allen, Vt., on the tenth, the District of Columbia troops left on the eleventh, while Battery A, of Massachusetts, and the New York troops, started on the twelfth. It was not until Friday, the 13th, that the invading force commenced to land at New Bedford, Mass. On the afternoon of that day the U. S. transport, Kilpatrick, loafed up Buzzards Bay at a five-knot gait, felt her way up the Acushnet River and made fast to a pier at New Bedford, closely followed by the Puritan and Pilgrim.

The city had been all "agog" for two days, and well she might, the scenes were such as any American city seldom sees, and New Bedford considered herself remarkably fortunate to be able to witness the spectacle.

All that afternoon the moving troops filled the narrow streets, while bulky auto trucks of the quartermaster's department rumbled back and forth as they moved commissary supplies and ammunition to the front. Crowds stood in gaping wonder at the strange and interesting sights, windows and roofs were crowded, every available place from which a good sight of the soldiers could be obtained was filled. Many had dreamed of such things but had never expected to see them, at any rate not in the staid old thoroughfare of their town.

Order gradually came out of the chaos of boxes, stacked arms, cavalry horses and mixed companies on the water front and shortly after three o'clock the troops began to move inland. The route of march led

through the northern end of the town and out into the country, and finally, bit by bit, the long line of infantry, cavalry and artillery was broken into segments and sent into various fields for temporary camps, and when the sun came up on Saturday morning, General Bliss's Red Army was ready for its advance on Boston. It also found General Pew and his Blue Army on its way to the front and when night came its line of defense extended from Taunton to Plymouth, over seventeen miles. On the extreme left was the 9th infantry then the 8th and 5th, forming the 1st Brigade at Halifax; then came the Provisional Brigade at Division headquarters, including the 1st and 2d Corps of Cadets, Troop A, Batteries A, C and D at Robin Pond. The 1st Brigade, made up of the Coast Artillery Corps, 2d Regiment and 6th Regiment at Paper Mill Village, near Bridgewater, with Troops A and D at Scotland.

Saturday night was one of the coldest of that summer, and the soldiers of both armies were too cold to sleep much, but lay shivering all night, and were only too glad when reveille blew at four o'clock.

On Sunday the Brigade camps were spread out, each command sending a battalion of infantry on outpost duty. The battalion in turn, sent squads and companies to patrol and reconnoiter all roads several miles in advance. The 3d battalion of the 8th Regiment, Blue Army, under the command of Major Perry, was advanced as far south as South Halifax.

The movements of the invading Red Army on

Sunday consisted of a simple advance and at night it camped south of Lake Assawampsett and Long Pond. During the day miles of wire had been laid in advance toward Taunton and cavalry and bicycle scouts were sent off in that direction, giving every indication that General Bliss intended to strike the Blue Army's right flank.

Waiting several hours the next morning, apparently with the idea of giving General Pew an opportunity to act upon the information which his scouts brought in, General Bliss suddenly shifted his forces some ten miles east, sending his cavalry directly north to capture Middleboro. The Red cavalry scouts ran into the point of the advance guard of the 8th Regiment about a mile north of Middleboro at eleven o'clock and were fired upon. Both parties made a hasty retreat. The shots, however, brought up the 1st battalion of the 8th Regiment, who entrenched on Pratt's Hill, just out of the town, which they held until nearly one o'clock, when the 10th Cavalry charged the hill, reenforced by the New Jersey Cavalry and the Connecticut bicycle squad. It was almost history repeating itself. There was San Juan again, even to Richard Harding Davis, who was following the maneuvers for Collier's Weekly.

The battalion of the 8th was driven back, but they retired in good order with small loss.

At night the invading army had advanced about seven miles. Its advance force was in possession of Middleboro and its main army was located at Rock,

about eight miles south of the city. General Bliss stated that he had suddenly changed his plans and advanced on the right flank because General Pew had gone to the trouble of blowing up several bridges the other way.

As night closed in the drizzling rain which had been coming down from time to time during the day turned into a downpour and added to the discomfort of the preceding nights of chilly atmosphere. Streets and hotels of Middleboro were crowded with soldiers, sightseers and war correspondents, the latter really forming a third army. When the two armies pitched their camps, green soldiers lay down to sleep in pools of water and sentries had hard work lifting their feet in waterlogged shoes. All night long the rain came down in torrents.

The next morning more than one soldier repeated Sherman's famous aphorism as he pulled himself together and fell into line at four o'clock, with a northeaster, the worst for many a month, threatening to blow away the camp. Shortly after five the Red Army advanced with a screen of cavalry thrown out on its left. This cavalry soon encountered a Blue force at "The Green," two miles north of Middleboro, which finally fell back on the rise outside of the little hamlet of Eddyville. Here for three hours Colonel Sweetser's regiment, the 8th Mass., lay in the slanting drive of the rain and fired from behind solid stone walls and mossy headstones of the old graveyard on the hill, and held at bay the entire strength of the Red Army. Just

as the 8th was about to retreat before the fierce attack of the 7th New York, the Battery A machine guns got into action. This required the Red Army to hold up until its field artillery could be brought up and put the machine guns out of business. After this there was nothing for the Blue Army to do but retreat in good order, and at one o'clock the Red Army had an advance of eight miles to its credit.

As night approached it found the men of both armies drenched to the skin and facing a tough proposition. Not a dry spot in or near the camps was to be found and, in most cases, the blankets that the soldiers were to throw over them were as wet as was their clothing. The weather was cold and it was still raining in torrents. However, the men were pretty well exhausted after the long march in the mud and rain, with water-soaked coats on, Pup tents and blankets rolled horse collar about their necks, and slept in spite of the existing conditions. For two days and a night it had rained without let up. All the roads had been converted into quagmires and the camping places of the troops had become really unfit for the pasture of horses. The men themselves were not only wet and tired but they were bruised and footsore.

The Red Army camped between Plympton and North Carver, and the outlook for General Pew was bad. It seemed as though the Red Army had got the jump on him, but he was cleverly concentrating his army without taking the press into his confidence.

On Wednesday morning the rain was still falling,

the men from both sides had had a bad night but appeared contented even though they were still wet to the skin.

There were repeated skirmishes as the Reds advanced. General Bliss's main body was marching directly north over the road which leads from Plympton to Bryantville, by way of Monponset Pond, while on a parallel road he had a line of defense from which a cavalry screen was thrown out. His idea was to engage the Blue Army at every cross road with his defense, and under the impression that it was the advance of his main body, hold them until his real main force had got a good advance. It was a clever scheme and worked beautifully at first, and General Bliss in this way really succeeded in getting around the Blue's left flank.

The Red Army won most of the skirmishes during the morning and would have won the battle of Halifax at noon but for the timely arrival of Colonel Thomas Talbot and the 1st and 2d Corps of Cadets, which was just enough of a re-enforcement to check the advance, and at one o'clock, which was the time hostilities ceased, each day, General Pew's army was holding its own.

The Blue Army had been scattered over twenty to thirty miles of defensive line owing to the uncertainty of where the attack would be made, and on Wednesday night few expected that General Pew could rally his forces in time, and the press of the country announced in headlines that it was defeated and Boston, theoretically, was captured. They did not know General Pew, nor

foresee the masterful way in which he was to concentrate his forces. It took long and fast marches, which astounded the Red Army. Even the regular army officers and the foreign attaches were amazed when, on Thursday morning. they found the Blue Division Headquarters at South Hanson, with its entire army massed about it.

For four days the Blue Army had given way against the onslaughtering of the enemy, and for four days they had been credited with defeat. They were not defeated; it was part of their game to fall back until their army was ready. They were now ready and instead of waiting to be attacked they made the advance.

At six o'clock in the morning the battle of Bryantville took place. As on previous days, General Bliss sent a force at the Blue Line while his main army proceeded north. The 1st and 2d District of Columbia Infantry turned into Bryantville with instructions to hold their ground, if possible, until eight o'clock, at which time the Red Army would be at North Pembroke, but General Pew, to use a slang expression, "was on," and leaving a small force to fight it out with the District of Columbia troops, he sent a battalion of the 2d Infantry and Battery C by a short cut through Oldtown, Furnace and Great Sandy Ponds to Hanover Four Corners, while the 8th Regiment and Battery A were sent double time by way of South Hanover. Engineers were sent ahead in automobiles to blow up the bridge over the North River and thus cut off the Red Army, but before this could be done they were

MILITIAMEN ON A "HIKE." TEN MINUTES' HALT AT THE END OF EVERY FIFTY MINUTES

driven back by the advance guard. At about ten o'clock the 7th New York, which was in advance, met the battalion of the 2d at Four Corners. A sharp fight ensued and just as defeat for the Blues was pending the 8th came up on the run, having come some seven miles at double quick. Capt. George E. Thorne, U. S. A., detailed with the 8th Massachusetts as Umpire, in his official report to the War Department, wrote of the remarkable time made by this regiment as follows: "From Gurney Corner the regiment made a forced march to the Four Corners, making about seven miles in one hour and twenty-five minutes. The regiment arrived in good condition, only five men having fallen out. During the action the fire discipline was very good. The men were well handled and availed themselves of both artificial and natural cover." They turned the battle and drove the 7th back over the railroad track. The 14th New York re-enforced the Reds and the 9th was added to the Blues, and so the engagement became general.

At one o'clock the Red Army had been obliged to call back the 10th Cavalry from its dash to Boston, and was in such a position that they could not have possibly moved on without four or five days more of the hardest kind of fighting. Their men were bunched in Hanover, while Battery A, of the Blue Army, from a position a mile away, was sending three-inch projectiles into the town at a rate that meant annihilation.

At one o'clock the maneuvers were called off. The troops bivouacked over night and in the morning started

for their home stations. As is customary, no decision was given and, as usual, both sides claimed the victory.

General Wood expressed himself as greatly pleased at the showing of all concerned, and stated that he considered the maneuvers of more value than any that had ever taken place in this country up to that time. Their importance has been fully realized and the War Department contemplates repeating them from time to time. The chief advantage of such maneuvers is to test the supply departments of the Regular Army, and the staff officers connected therein both of the regular service and Organized Militia and also to give opportunity to the higher officers to exercise in the field the functions of command. They serve as a school of instruction for the military division and of all the various units connected with a military division in the same sense as there is a school for the company, one for the battalion and one for the regiment. A military division on each side, progressing from point to point, from day to day, unfolds strategical and tactical problems of attack and defense, involves a high class of training in field-service duties for all grades, and especially introduces transportation and supply problems. The next great event to the militia was the detailing of a number of officers from each state to the maneuvers in Texas.

A MILITIA OFFICER WITH THE REGULARS

DURING the year of 1910 this government received numerous complaints from the Diaz government that the insurrectos in Mexico were securing their arms and ammunition from this country. With a view to stopping this the United States sent a small force to guard the border, but one sufficient to accomplish its mission. It was therefore a great surprise to the public when the papers announced, without warning, that twenty thousand troops, practically all at the time in the United States, were on their way to Texas.

When this order for mobilizing troops in Texas was made known, many thought that this government would not go to such an enormous expense except with an idea of crossing into Mexico. Many claim that the mobilization was caused by state reasons. The first troops arrived in San Antonio on March 10th, and it is claimed that the reason for their being sent no longer existed on the 15th. It has been stated on good authority that the true reason for the mobilization was the attempt of Japan to secure through a transportation company a coaling station in Magdalena Bay, Mexico, and that in return she was to furnish Diaz some mercenary troops to put down the rebellion. The reason given in Washington, however, was the difficulty of maintaining strict neutrality on the border.

Every preparation was made for an invasion into Mexico, and the situation was undoubtedly far more serious than the general public dreamed. The first of April found the Mexican border patrolled from the Pacific to the Gulf of Mexico, a distance of about fifteen hundred miles, with a division located at San Antonio, Texas, and a brigade near San Diego, California. Rumors that the National Guard was soon to join the regulars were current, no doubt due to the fact that they were prepared to start at a few hours' notice. Shortly after the arrival of the troops at San Antonio it was announced at the War Department that certain militia officers would be sent to Texas and detailed with officers of their own rank for observation and instruction. The writer was among those chosen for this detail and left within twenty-four hours after receiving the following order:

THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

Boston, May 20, 1911.

Special Orders: No. 93.

1. In accordance with the instructions of the Secretary of War, date of April 22, 1911 (D.M.A. 23024), you will report to the commanding general, Maneuver Camp, San Antonio, Texas, on May 27, 1911, "to participate in the joint encampment, maneuver and field instruction of the Regular Army and Militia" (Section 15, Militia Law), for purposes of observation and instruction.

2. Officers will be paid by paymasters of the Regular Army at the United States rate of pay after muster by proper officers of the United States Army, and before their departure for home stations, submitting copy of this order to the paymaster, U. S. A., there being three copies issued to each officer.

3. Tentage will be supplied by the camp commander, but full field equipment, including folding cot, bedding and mess kit, will be taken. In this connection it is recommended that there be taken both cotton khaki and olive drab uniforms, toilet kit, slicker, rubber boots, water pail, folding lantern, candles, piece of canvas. Mounted officers are recommended to take saddle soap, folding canvas bucket, nosebag, saddle pad, curry comb, brush, picket line and flashlight.

5. Mounts will not be taken, but mounted officers will carry full horse equipment.

The commanding general of the Maneuver Camp will assist the militia officers in hiring private mounts in the vicinity of the camp.

Horse hire and forage will be paid for out of funds of the allotment to the state under Section 1661, Revised Statutes, as amended. The allowance for horses and forage together will not exceed $4 a day a mount.

Horse hire and forage will be paid by the officers personally. Bills presented for reimbursement by officers for horse hire and forage will be rendered in duplicate and will be accompanied by receipted bill or voucher (single) showing that money has been paid. No officer can receive reimbursement without voucher attached to bill.

6. The chief quartermaster, department of the East, U. S. A., through the depot quartermaster, U. S. A. Army Building, Whitehall Street, New York City, will furnish direct to the individual addresses

transportation requests to cover the trip from home residences to San Antonio, Texas, and return.

7. In the absence of definite instructions pertaining to the messing of officers, it is presumed that they will participate in the officers' mess of the officer to whom they are attached, and will individually settle their mess accounts upon conclusion of tour.

The expense of all subsistence en route and in camp is borne by the individual officer.

8. Attention is drawn to the fact that any officer detailed to this duty will not be excused from further ordered duty (Infantry Field Officers School, June, 1911, or Massachusetts Maneuvers, July, 1911) by plea of length of duty under the provisions of this order.

9. It is especially urged that the officers named for duty will so conduct themselves as to extract the greatest possible amount of instruction in the time allotted, bearing in mind that they are on paid duty, and to the end that increased efficiency may result to the several branches of the service of the Massachusetts Volunteer Militia.

By Order of the Commander-in-Chief,

Gardner W. Pearson,
The Adjutant-General,
Chief of Staff.

To Lieut. ——, B. Q. M. & C.
8th Regiment Infantry.

SEAL.

THE MANEUVER DIVISION AT SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS, 1911

In a subsequent mail the following letter was received enclosing requisition on the railroads for transportation, berth and one hundred and fifty pounds excess baggage:

WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE DEPOT QUARTERMASTER
NEW YORK CITY

May 22, 1911.

LIEUTENANT ——,

Batt. Q. M. & Comsy, 8th Inf., Mass. N. J.
Boston, Mass.

SIR: This office having been requested by the Chief Quartermaster, Department of the East, to provide the transportation for the officers of the National Guard from the various states in the department, who are to attend the army maneuvers at San Antonio, Texas, I have the honor to inclose herewith Transportation Requests, P. Nos. 167138, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, covering your journey from Boston, Mass., to San Antonio, Texas, and return, including transportation for the authorized allowance of field baggage.

The Requests for the journey to San Antonio should be presented to the ticket agent of the designated railroad at your station, and after the rail and sleeping car tickets have been obtained, they should be dated and signed by you and turned over to the ticket agent. When receipting the Request for the Pullman accommodations, it should be stated by you whether a lower or an upper berth has been issued (an upper one in case no lower is available), also, if Pullman accommodation is not available from the starting point of the

journey, the place from which it was available and obtained should be stated in the receipt.

The Request for the excess baggage is drawn for the full field allowance, and does not include the one hundred and fifty pounds which the railroad carries free on every first-class ticket. The baggage which you are entitled to carry is therefore one hundred and fifty pounds, plus the amount for which the Request is drawn; but in no case will the government pay for any baggage in excess of that amount.

All baggage which you take with you should be weighed by the baggage master at your railroad station, and after the one hundred and fifty pounds free allowance have been deducted from the total weight, the Request should be receipted for the remaining number of pounds. In other words, the Request should be receipted for only such excess baggage over the one hundred and fifty pounds which is carried free, as is actually transported.

Similar action should be taken on the return journey.

Please acknowledge receipt.

Respectfully,

399–32

.....incls.

M. Gray Zalinski,
Deputy Q. M. General, U. S. Army,
Depot Quartermaster,

by R. S. Granger,
Capt. & Quartermaster, U. S. A.,
Assistant.

At San Antonio there were about fourteen thousand men camped just beyond the city limits near Fort Sam Houston. I had expected to find the city a wild western

kind of place surrounded by Alkali desert and cactus plant. But to my surprise found it the center of many miles of fertile black soil, producing cotton, cattle, mohair, and wool, corn, millet, onions, and an occasional field of rice. Land that six years ago could have been purchased for thirty dollars an acre is to-day, by means of artesian wells and irrigation, producing one hundred and fifty bushels of corn or a carload of onions to the acre and selling for $75 to $400 per acre. The city itself is, for a place of one hundred thousand, a wonder. It is the largest and oldest of Texas cities, and possesses historical and picturesque show places, which in a foreign country would be visited by thousands of worshiping Americans. The city is dotted with pretty little plazas, twenty-one in all. It has several hotels which would compare favorably with any in our largest cities, and at night the streets are arched with electric light. The roof gardens are crowded with pretty women and officers and foreign attaches in bright uniforms. The plazas are filled with Mexicans, and the soft music of stringed instruments may be heard coming from the open-air restaurants where chili-con-carne, tamales and many other Mexican dishes may be purchased. But possibly San Antonio is best known as the home of the Alamo. Built in 1718 by the monks as a mission, it has withstood many attacks of the Indians, and in 1836 was the last rallying place of Travis, Crockett, and Bowie, and their devoted band of patriots, who fought for the freedom of Texas until the last man was killed. It is to the southwest what

Bunker Hill is to the east.

It is a bit disturbing to be unable to tell more of this interesting city for lack of space, especially when one's impressions are so favorable. But my story is of the army, so I must only mention the existence of a Mexican quarter, of a residential section with hundreds of fine homes, hot sulphur wells, clubs, and the famous Buck Horn Saloon.

The camp at San Antonio had been in existence a month when I arrived and was running as smoothly as any well-oiled piece of machinery. I found it situated on a waterless, treeless, verdureless plateau of prairie land about five miles from the heart of the city, and near Fort Sam Houston, whose red tile roofs could easily be seen, with the church spires of the city in the background, to the south, while to the west and east roll unkept gray prairies. General Carter's Division Headquarters, where I reported for orders, were on a slight elevation, giving a fine view of the camp which seemed to stretch to the horizon. Avenue after avenue of khaki tents containing the U. S. A. rose like mounds of yellow desert sand covering thousands of acres. It was a beautiful morning, the sun not yet high enough to be uncomfortable. Bugle calls echoed across the wide spaces. Off in the distance a cavalry regiment stood out against the sky line. Half a mile away a line of infantry obeyed the command, "Open chambers, close chambers," with simultaneous click. Half a dozen bands practised in different sections. Processions of loaded wagons and pack mules moved in differ-

ent directions. The smoke from a hundred incinerators curled upward into the vivid blue sky of southern Texas. As I stood trying to accustom myself to the wonderful sight before me, a scouting aeroplane sailed like a great hawk overhead. All that I saw this first morning I soon found was a small part of the day's continuous activity, and in spite of the seeming disorganization I found all was regular and orderly. Everyone had his work cut out for him, all did their part and did it thoroughly, which explains why everything moved like clockwork in the great camp.

At Division Headquarters I received the following memorandum of my assignment to the 13th Infantry:

HEADQUARTERS MANEUVER DIVISION

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

May 27, 1911.

Memorandum

Lieutenant ——, B. Q. M. & C., 8th Inf., M. V. M., having reported at these headquarters this date pursuant to instructions from the Secretary of War, is hereby attached, for duty, to an officer of equal rank in the 13th Infantry, and will report in person to the Commanding General, 2d Brigade, for assignment accordingly.

By command of Major-General Carter

A. T. Ladd,
Lieut.-Colonel, Adjutant-General,
Division Adjutant.

I reported at once to this regiment, made my official call upon the commanding officer, Colonel Loughborough, and was attached to the 1st Battalion with Lieutenant Joe Tapham, who is well known at Sea Girt and other places for his shooting. The next few days I had much time to myself, which allowed me to ride about the great camp examining and questioning everybody and everything I saw. As I look back at what I did I marvel at the uniformly courteous and hospitable treatment that was accorded me by officers and men. There was no question too trivial nor any subject so complex but that the officers with whom I came in contact would devote themselves to providing me with the information desired. And I fear that in many cases they were really sacrifices on the altar of politeness. There are several ways correspondents may handle maneuvers and of course the work depends to some extent upon what one's paper wants. One way is to sit close to headquarters; it doesn't weigh much, but from the copy appearing in many of the papers it was what a great many were doing. A division review had been ordered the evening of the day of my arrival. It took the division one hour and sixty-five minutes to pass in column of companies, and even to one familiar with military maneuvers on a large scale it was an awe-inspiring sight to see the infantry march by with the precision of clockwork, to watch the cavalry men sit their horses as if part of them, and to behold the artillery handle their six-horse hitches with every toggle taut. It might be well to add that divi-

sion reviews since the Civil War in the U. S. A. have been nearly as scarce as hens' teeth. No wonder, then, that the citizen who saw one of these reviews felt as he saw regiment after regiment pass by with bands playing and colors flying, that his army is mighty and able to "lick" anything, especially when told that another force just as large and just as good could be put in the field in little time. But in this great review there were less than 15,000 men, and when you take up your history and read that in the battle of Gettysburg the loss on the Union side alone was 23,000, approximately one-half of our entire standing army to-day you can see just how small it really is. The personnel of our army is the best of any army, and the officers and men would pass muster anywhere without particular effort upon their part, but what show would our army of 60,000 stand, however high in personnel or efficient in work, against Japan with 700,000 regulars, or Germany with over a million? We have a fine nucleus for a great army, if the people will but come to their senses and allow it to be increased.

I was awakened shortly before Reveille the next morning, by the whir of an aeroplane passing over my tent, but so accustomed had man and beast become to these great artificial birds that it attracted little attention. Soon my "striker" (as the private who works for an officer in order to earn extra money is termed) brought my chow, and while I was eating, an orderly stopped before my tent, and with heels together and a "snappy" salute, presented the colonel's compliments,

and stated that the colonel would be pleased to have the lieutenant join him in a ride about camp, starting from regimental headquarters at eight o'clock. Naturally the lieutenant was pleased, and the ride proved a pleasant one. We spent the morning visiting all departments from the signal corps to the bakeries. At the latter place I watched the method of cooking bread in clay ovens. The ovens are made by placing two barrels end to end, and covering with several inches of clay, wet to a consistency that made it pliable. A fire was then made in the barrels which consumed them and baked the clay. They are then allowed to harden for a day or two, after which other fires are built in them, then withdrawn, and the dough placed inside, openings are closed and the heat from the clay bakes the bread.

Possibly the most interesting sight to the average visitor to the great camp was the picket lines of the cavalry, where nearly seven thousand horses were tied, but the sanitary arrangements were by far the most interesting to the writer. The health of the troops at San Antonio was excellent, in spite of the fact that the local conditions were infinitely worse than those which were confronted at the outbreak of the Spanish War. The reason for this is that the army has made a study of hygiene since 1898. In army camps to-day every bit of refuse is burned from the first day. At the end of each company street a hole is dug about a foot deep, four feet wide and seven feet long; these holes are lined with stone and a fire is kept burning day and night. All liquid is poured on the stones, and evapo-

rates, and the soluble matter is thrown on the fire. Oil is poured in the sinks each day and they are burned and then lined. Every officer and enlisted man at San Antonio had had the anti-typhoid vaccination as a result of the following order:

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 9, 1911.

COMMANDING GENERAL,
The Maneuver Division,
San Antonio, Texas.

In view great danger from typhoid fever, Secretary of War has approved recommendation Surgeon-General that troops that participate in maneuvers and that are not already protected against typhoid fever have anti-typhoid serum administered to them at once.

Such procedure being contemplated by General Orders Number 10, War Department, Nineteen Nine, and General Orders Number Two Twenty-seven, War Department, Nineteen Ten. Take action accordingly with regard to troops of your command. Acknowledge.

By order Secretary War,

McCain,
Adjutant-General.

Official copy respectfully furnished to all organizations commanders who will confer with the proper medical officer and arrange to have anti-typhoid serum administered to all members of their commands, except

cases where the medical officer considers protection already exists.

By command of Major-General Carter:

E. F. Ladd,
Lieut.-Col., Adjutant-General,
Division Adjutant.

A. G. O., Maneuver Division,
San Antonio, Texas,
March 18, 1911.

As a result there was but one case of typhoid, and that was a teamster who had not been vaccinated. All water was boiled unless it had been pronounced pure by a surgeon. All food was kept covered where the house fly could not reach it. Men are taught the necessity of personal cleanliness. Special attention is given to the teeth and feet. Each man is furnished with a First Aid package. No soldier in the world is better protected than ours. In addition to our regular Medical Corps, there exists a Reserve Corps of surgeons, all having the rank of First Lieutenant, made up of practically every surgeon of reputation in the United States. In time of war this Reserve Corps would remain at the base of supplies and act as experts on various subjects.

Recently a machine gun platoon has been added to each infantry regiment. The platoon has two guns, each gun can push out automatically more than six hundred bullets a minute (for a few seconds) as if a long continuous rod of balls was being thrown out of the

gun. It can also be made to sprinkle its shot as roads are watered by a hose. It can cover a larger or smaller space and fire to a greater or less distance as the gunner wills. The bullets are the same size as those used in rifles. They are inserted into a long canvas belt, and this belt is loaded into the chambers of the gun; it works like a film of the vistascope. When in action the noise sounds much like a compressed air hammer. In the Japanese-Russian War whole companies were wiped out with this gun. The gun has one hundred and forty-five parts. Lieutenant Powell of the 13th Infantry had trained his men so that they could unlimber the gun in thirty-six seconds and assemble it in forty-eight seconds. This time is close to the record, but Powell is recognized as an authority on this machine. Several improvements on the original gun have been made by him and adopted by the Ordnance Department. The guns, which now after constant drill can be taken apart and put together again in less than two minutes, only a short time ago were considered so complicated that it was thought necessary to send them to an arsenal to be taken apart.

About half a mile to the east of headquarters were the field engineers at work erecting a modern redoubt. The old method of fortifying a city is obsolete in modern armament. First, because high-powered artillery has made masonry, formerly a big factor in fortification, a danger rather than a protection; and secondly, modern tactics have been so modified as to make strongly fortified points a negligible quantity. Except in the

case of our harbors, mountain passes, the Panama Canal, etc., the fort is a thing of the past.

This redoubt was nearly completed and as one approached was discernible only as a bank of earth. With this masked, as is done in warfare, practically nothing could be seen to the untrained eye. The ground plan of this redoubt was elliptical, and was divided into practically two parts, the bomb-proof shelter and the parapet. The former are nothing more than chambers where the infantry defending a position may take refuge during a heavy artillery fire. These are six feet below the surface and seven feet high. The parapets are above the bomb proofs and level with the ground. These are five feet high and formed by sand bags against which is thrown the earth taken from the bomb proofs. As a rule a redoubt is built for two companies of infantry and four machine guns. Artillery is no longer employed in redoubts, and they will stand heavy bombardment, the sacks of dirt absorbing the heaviest of artillery fire without great harm. To make the approaches as difficult as possible another ditch, filled with barbed-wire entanglements is provided. The real purpose of the redoubt is for holding effectively important ground. Providing there are a sufficient number of men, and the ground yields easily to the pick and shovel, a redoubt can be built in forty-eight hours.

During the next few days I spent my spare time riding about the great camp always finding something new and of interest. Each regiment had at least one

dog, all breeds, from a stray tramp mongrel to some really fine, intelligent and clever animals. No one could tell where they originally came from. They simply wandered in, were fed and petted by the men, and soon became a fixture. Many were veterans of Cuba and the Philippines. They never got in the way. When the regiment was on a march or a parade, these four-footed soldiers fell in the rear and kept their place as well as many of the two-footed ones. Not a man but gladly shared his ration with them, and they show their appreciation by a strong preference for the enlisted man over the officer, and as for civilians, they passed them by as if they were the scum of the earth. The soldier man gets lots of amusement out of these pets and spends hours of his leisure time training them to do tricks.

One morning I accompanied Colonel Loughborough as one of his staff on a ride of twenty-two miles to the Hot Sulphur Wells, to ascertain if it was a suitable place for the regiment to go in camp. The thermometer read something over a hundred, and the glare of the sun on the white alkali soil was trying on the eyes, so that the natural sylvan park with its growth of palms and tropical plants at the Wells was very welcome when we arrived. On this trip we timed out horses as to how long it took them to walk a mile and also to trot the same distance. This method of timing the animal over a known distance is of much service in estimating distance afterward.

At these Sulphur Wells is a large ostrich farm. It

has been said that an ostrich is humorous. He certainly is curious and wants to know what is happening. Like the old-fashioned Harlem goat, they will eat everything from a tin can to a cartridge. From the Wells we proceeded on foot through the woods to the banks of a dirty, sluggish river lined with weeping willows, oak and banana trees. Reptile life was abundant.

Once our way was disputed by a great black water snake, while at almost every step lizards darted, with the speed of lightning, to safety. There were some rather large ones that held their tails in the air, and a species of toad with speckled backs was common. Crossing the river on a swinging barrel stave bridge, we struck out at a good clip for the ruins of the Mission San Jose, a mile away in the fields, on a trail taking us over aqueducts and ditches dug by the monks nearly two hundred years ago. This mission is the largest and most interesting of those about San Antonio. It was built in 1723, and the carving, or what remains of it, is wonderfully rich and effective.

To continue and tell all that was seen and done this first week, while at San Antonio, would fill a book. I visited the hospitals and attended Military Court — the officers' club where less notice is given to rank, and where a second lieutenant could meet socially a colonel. I watched, talked with, and studied the enlisted man, and after seeing the conditions that prevail and what he has to put up with it is hard to understand how people can oppose the re-establishment of the canteen

SANITARY TROOPS TAKING A DISABLED MAN TO THE FIELD HOSPITAL

A MACHINE GUN READY FOR USE

at army posts. If the W. C. T. U., or that part of it that was instrumental in having the canteen abolished, could see what they have done, I am sure they would regret their work. At San Antonio, within fifty yards of the tents of some of the men, but just off the military reservation so that the army has no jurisdiction over the conditions, was a street lined with the lowest imaginable resorts to prey upon the soldiers. There were eighteen saloons in this one street. The majority of them had amusement rooms, in which were many lewd women. This condition could not exist with the canteen in existence, as most of the men would be satisfied with beer and soft drinks and remain in camp, where the amount they drink would be regulated and they would be taken care of, the profits going to the company fund from which they benefit. As it is, not being able to get what they want, they go outside, and instead of drinking four per cent beer they drink whiskey or impure beer and bad gin, the result is that the first thing they know they have "shot somebody up" and deserted, been promptly brought back and become prisoners. These "hell-holes" did not exist about our army posts and navy yards in the days of the canteen, and they could not with its re-establishment.

About a week after my arrival the officers of the 11th Cavalry gave a dance, to which I was invited, at the Menger (a hotel of the Spanish type, low and rangy, with a beautiful courtyard). It was a wonderfully clear night with a full moon, and the sight was one you

read about in story books but seldom see. The palms, the fountains playing in the moonlight, the overhanging balconies, with senoritas looking down, the brilliantly lighted ballroom opening off the court from which the music of the band could be heard. The handsome women in decollete, and the officers in their white or their full dress uniforms, together with the foreign atmosphere of everything, made a veritable fairyland.

Returning to quarters at about 1.30, I found orders were out for the entire division to move out at five o'clock for Leon Springs, first call at 3.35. Everything that could be taken must be carried in the bedding roll, weight limited to forty pounds. I had reported to my regiment with only necessities, but now necessities became luxuries, and luxuries traditions of the past, together with good water, change of uniforms and beds. Before turning in, I packed my bedding roll, taking two blankets, for the nights are cold, even when the temperature is 110 during the day, a mess-kit, tin cup, knife and fork, toilet articles, and a change of underclothes.

It was after two when I lay down without undressing and slept like a night watchman until reveille.

The Maneuvers at Leon Springs

When I was awakened at 3.35 all was dark. It seemed but a minute since I had lain down. Through the openings in my tent I could see that the camp was all life, lanterns bobbed about in every direction. In

quick succession, a detail arrived for my bedding roll, my "striker" brought my ration of bacon, bread and cafe, and my orderly arrived with my horse. Wagons had been left standing at the end of the company streets the night before, and now were fast being filled. The amount of work to be done was enormous, it seemed an almost superhuman task to complete it in time, but at exactly five o'clock the regiment moved out, every man and team in line. It was beautiful. Ten minutes before it would have seemed a safe ten to one bet that it was impossible. As the day dawned it became hot and humid. The men had been allowed to put their blankets, ponchos and "pup tents" on the wagons but carried their rifle, haversack, canteen and mess-kit (about thirty-five pounds). Soon the last of the thatched Mexican huts on the outskirts of the city were left behind and the trail commenced to wind its way through a wilderness of chaparral growth. The column would march for fifty minutes and then rest ten. As the sun climbed higher in the sky the heat and dust commenced to tell on the men who became as white from the dust as the ground itself. Now and then a man would fall by the wayside to be picked up by the ambulance which followed in the rear of each regiment. These men were a pathetic sight. They hated to acknowledge defeat and give in, and when they finally dropped they were pretty much "all in."

As hours wore on the sun grew hotter and hotter. There was a breeze blowing across the desert, but that breeze was like the blast from a furnace. The sunrise

or sunset on the desert seldom fails to fascinate, but there are few who are attracted by it under the scorching noonday sun. It is difficult to realize how quickly that fierce sun dries up man and beast, and it was a revelation to see how the thirsty horses lowered the water when the water holes at Rattlesnake Hill were reached at a quarter after nine. We had marched sixteen miles and here we bivouacked until the next day.

The surrounding country was the home of rattlesnakes and scorpions, the tarantulas and the centipedes, a place where the grasshopper is four inches long and the sand is mixed up with millions of fleas, where the toads have horns and the redbug lives and razorback hogs roam wild.

As soon as we could get away, my friend, Captain Bolger, and I took our revolvers and set off through the chaparral which stretched on every side, in hopes of getting a shot at a wild boar or possibly an antelope. This so-called chaparral consists of an almost impenetrable growth of mesquite trees and various kinds of cactus. The mesquite tree is very deceptive. When seen from a distance, its greenness gives the impression that it is a restful screen from the sun, but only when covered by parasitical growth does it offer any shelter. The ground was covered with rocks, sand, and alkali dust, with no vegetation whatever. For several miles we pushed our way through this tangle, occasionally coming upon the white skeleton of some animal. Once we found a wild cat partly decomposed, probably the victim of a rattlesnake; overhead the sun was at a white

heat, the mesquite trees offering no shade. Now and then a heavily moving buzzard wheeled in circles or balanced himself with outstretched wings between us and the hot sky above. An occasional jackrabbit with his exaggerated ears gave us a start as he shot off through the cacti, but outside of these and two armadillos, which the soldiers call possums, in heavy marching order we saw no signs of life, and so, after three hours of aimless wandering through the chaparral, we followed the hand of our compass back to camp.

When we reached camp our clothes were as wet as if we had been in swimming, and our energy was the cause of much comment. Before it grew dark we selected a place to sleep, that was free from cactus, and stretched out on our blankets with our heads on our saddles and dozed away while we listened to the regimental band play the dear old "Prince of Pilsen" and other old familiar airs, taking many of the men back to "Old Broadway." It was a strange feeling to be here in this wild country listening to a band playing these familiar tunes while about one gamboled lizards and horned toads, while accasionally between the tunes we could hear the cry of coyotes. After the music had stopped I lay on the ground looking up at the sky and thinking of what was happening two thousand miles away in Boston. The stars seemed very near and made the world seem very wide as I lay there with only a blanket between us. It was a warm night and I was tired, and soon I stopped thinking about Boston. Indistinctly I heard taps, and the next thing I knew it was morning

and everyone was hustling to get his baggage ready for the wagon. At 5.30 we pulled out and "hiked" through Leon Springs to our station at Well No. 5, twelve miles away. As on the previous day, many men could not stand the pace and were picked up by the ambulances. The heat was intense and after the first five miles men and horses hung their heads and walked on silently and dejectedly. The white alkali dust rising in clouds from the ground made the men look like flour dumplings. Canteens were emptied ere long, and throats became dry and parched, and many were almost on the point of suffocation when camp was reached.

The practice of these long hard marches in intense heat seems a needless inflicted hardship, but their true value is made clear when it comes to a real fight. Hence the great importance of training men in times of peace, in waterless marches, night marches, and quick marches.

The next day there commenced the largest maneuvers ever held by the army in times of peace, the three brigades of infantry, the artillery and cavalry brigades, the engineer corps, and the signal and sanitary troops all participating.

Different problems were taken up each day, sometimes we fought an imaginary enemy and again the division was divided into two armies. There were outpost problems, employment of the reduced division against re-enforced brigade and the selection and occupation of defensive positions, involving simulated attacks. The following is a sample of an order which

would daily reach our regiment from Division Headquarters:

MANEUVER DIVISION
SCHASSE RANCH, TEXAS

6 June, 1911, 5-30 p.m.

Field Orders.
No. 17.

TROOPS.

Indep. Cav.
Lt. Col. Morgan.
1 Prov. Regt. Cav.
Det. Sig. Bn.

Advance Guard.
1 Regt. 1st Brig.

Main Body. (In order)
1st Brig. (less 1 Regt.)
Art. Brig. (less 1 Regt.)

2d Brigade.
2 Field Hosps.
1 Amb. Co.
Sig. Bn. (less Dets.)

Right Flank Guard.
Brig. Gen. Hoyt.
3d Brig.
1 Regt. F. Art. (less 1 Bn.)
Det. Sig. Bn.

1. The enemy with a force of all arms is reported in camp six miles northeast of 14.
2. This Command will continue its march on NEW BRAUNFELS tomorrow.
3. (a). The Independent Cavalry will march at 7.00 a.m. via H and I to M covering our left.
(b). The Advance Guard will clear 9 at 7.00 a.m. and march 12-13-14.
(c). The Main Body will follow the Advance Guard at 800 yards.
(d). The Right Flank will march at 7.00 a.m. via 4-17.
(e). The Signal Battalion will maintain communication between the Independent Cavalry, Brigades and these Headquarters.
4. Ammunition sections will accompany regiments.
Trains will await orders in camp. One ambulance company will accompany the Right Flank Guard, the remainder of the Sanitary Troops will follow the main body well closed.
5. Messages will reach the Division Commander at Tanks southwest of 4 until 8.30 a.m.

By Command of Major-General Carter
S. C. MILLS, Chief of Staff.

Day after day we hiked across this wild country, climbed the barren hills, waded through long stretches of prairie grass, sometimes coming across acres of brilliant colored wild flowers. In our leisure we killed rattlesnakes and hunted for wild bees' nests and honey. Whenever the men halted for a rest, there were always some who busied themselves turning over stones in search of centipedes and scorpions and when found a

crowd would gather to watch a fight to death between the insects. At night we went to sleep viewing the stars and listening to singing insects. During the day the sun would blind and scorch, but at night the dew would fall like a cold rain and one would shiver with two blankets. It was a country where there were no roses, but where everything that grew had thorns, few trees, no running streams, but an ocean of gray chaparral with white dusty trails, cactus trying to rob you of your clothing, and poisonous bugs and insects at every hand. It was the kind of country which made General Sheridan say that if he owned both places he would rent Texas and live in hell.

It was with little regret that on the ninth of June the water suddenly ran dry in the artesian wells and we were forced to immediately leave for Fort Sam Houston which seemed like a great metropolis. Why the reservation was named Leon Springs is a puzzle, and to the troops the name soon ceased to suggest an oasis in the desert with waving palms and crystal waters. To all who have been there it spells dust, thirst, perspiration, strained sinews and profanity.

General Carter ordered an all night force march to the Fort, twenty-eight miles away. But so glad were all to go, that no one was dismayed at the ordeal ahead. I was detailed to accompany the regimental baggage train, and pulled out with it at 5.30, starting on what proved to be a unique experience. Participating in an all night march with a division was as new to the regulars as it was with me. It is not often that one

is called upon to sit in the saddle and watch the sun set across the prairie, watch the moon come up and go down and still be in the saddle when the sun appears in the east.

We proceeded about three miles when the baggage train halted to allow the artillery to pass; this took nearly two hours, so that when we again took up the trail the sun was sinking behind the rolling dunes of white sand, leaving the giant cactus silhouetted like great sentinels. All about us they rose from the level floor of the desert, in some cases thirty to forty feet high. The air seemed cool in comparison with the heat of the day, although the ground was still warm to the touch. But when we started forward the horses kicked up great clouds of dust. So suffused with dust was the air that only now and then were we able to see further than a wagon ahead; only by tying handkerchiefs about our nose and mouth could we breathe without choking. The night was bright with moonlight, and but for the dust the trip would have been enjoyable, so picturesque did everything appear. As in the day marches, the column halted every fifty minutes, and when it did the men would drop in their tracks and be asleep before the bugle sounded attention. I knew that before morning I would need rest, so dismounted each time, throwing the reins over my horse's head, and lay down in the trail in dust inches deep. Here there was less likelihood of being bitten by insects. Once, as we started forward, I found a tarantula in my hat, and I found twenty-two fresh red-bug bites the

next day, but this was part of the game, and you might as well try to catch Texas fleas with boxing gloves as to hope to visit Leon Springs and not be bitten by red-bugs and jiggers.

About two o'clock in the morning we reached Lyons Ranch with its general store and saloon. I rode up and looked in at the door. It was a scene such as Frederic Remington used to draw. The room was cloudy with smoke and the men sitting about the tables with cards or dice, or leaning against the bar, were the kind you see imitated on the stage in the east. Their sombreros, with rattlesnake skins or leather straps about them, the broad kerchief knotted about their throats, leather leggings which came to their waists, cartridge belts and revolvers, all seemed like clever make-ups. But it was the real thing, and they had ridden miles from other ranches to see the army pass and "have a night of it." These cowboys are not a bad lot, and when you know them you can't help liking them for their sincerity and squareness. They haven't much respect for the law, but live on a code of their own. In this country if a man insults your wife, all you've got to do is to go out and blow his head off, and the unwritten law backs you up by acquitting you. As Captain Bill McDonald used to say, "You've got to be willing to charge hell with a bucket of water," to make good with these fellows. "Come in, brother, and have a beer," greeted me as I stopped before the door, and to my inquiry as to when the first of the troops passed, I was told 7.30. The baggage train was the end of the division

which stretched out nine miles. Does a procession which takes six and one-half hours to pass impress the reader? It did the cowboys, and one expressed to me confidentially, "My God! Enough troops have passed here to-night to lick Japan and Mexico and Germany thrown in." All of which only goes to show how little the average civilian knows about the comparative strength of our army with foreign nations.

The moon went down about two, and until day dawned it was all I could do to keep awake. Time and again I went to sleep, to be awakened by a lurch which nearly sent me off my saddle. Finally I dismounted and walked for miles. At every halt my horse would try and lie down, and a horse must be pretty tired to do that. As day dawned everyone presented a laughable picture, with blackened faces and whitened hair and eyebrows. With the light we all felt better, and after reaching camp at 6.15, some of the enlisted men actually got out and played ball. Practically no one thought of taking any sleep. The actual time made by the Thirteenth Infantry was ten hours and eleven minutes, including ten-minute stops every fifty minutes, a distance of approximately twenty-eight miles.

On the Banks of the Rio Grande

The next day I left for Eagle Pass on the Rio Grande, one hundred and six miles as the aeroplane travels. My disgust for the country increased in geometric progression with each hour I spent on the trip. The

country through which I traveled was flatter, dryer, hotter, and less interesting than that at Leon Sptings. There were stretches for miles with not even cactus or sage brush to relieve the eyes or mark the way. It is this strip of country that we actually went to war with Mexico over, and as Richard Harding Davis says: We should go to war with Mexico again and force her to take it back. No one who has not seen the utter desolateness of the place can appreciate the barrenness from description. It is a country where hardly twenty-five centimeters of rain fall in a year, a place of sand storms and burning heat and no natural deposit of water, where the thermometer goes as high as one hundred and seventeen in the shade and one hundred and fifty in the sun, where cattle die of starvation and practically no white men live. It is Mexican in its people, its language, and its mode of life. The inhabitants of this wilderness are ranch-owners and their cowboys. A ranch consists of a saloon and a few thatched adobe houses. These ranches are on an average twenty miles apart. Life in the field in this country is as near that of the stone age as men often come.

At Eagle Pass were two troops of the Third Cavalry. They were camped among the ruins of old Fort Duncan, which was abandoned and allowed to fall into decay about twelve years ago. These two troops patroled the bank of the river for fifty miles in either direction. On the east they touched another troop of the Third, who in turn patroled fifty miles beyond, while to the west

was a detachment of six mounted infantrymen. In this way a constant patrol was kept up from the Pacific Ocean to the Gulf of Mexico.

I arrived at Eagle Pass about seven P.M., and reported to the officer in command, Captain Van Way. I found the camp situated on slightly elevated ground with a picturesque setting. The sun was seeking the peaks of the barren hills to the west, their long shadows nearly reaching to the adobe ruins of the old fort. In front flowed the historical Rio Grande. It was muddy and sluggish, but it was water and wet, and bespoke of life and vegetation after many miles of desert. This great river, starting as it does in the San Juan Mountains in Colorado, flows generally southeast into the Gulf of Mexico, and forms on its way the entire boundary between Texas and Mexico, eighteen hundred miles long. At all points along the course eager hands seize it and appropriate its substance for irrigation purposes until during the summer it ceases being a howling, rushing, dangerous stream, and late in the fall hardly more than dampness is left in the bed. It is impoverished that many may be fed.

My stay at this post was made especially interesting by the kindness and courtesies of Captain Van Way, who accompanied me on my trips across the border. He had just made, prior to my arrival, a record ride of one hundred miles in a little less than twenty-four hours. He had accompanied the colonel down the river fifty miles below his patrol, and on his return in an off-hand way continued to ride all day and all night,

changing horses at the different camps. But Captain Van Way looks capable of doing that kind of a "stunt" once a week. Another man whom I was fortunate enough to meet, and later came to feel as if I knew, was First Lieutenant Kelton L. Pepper, Twenty-third Infantry. Pepper was in command of the detail of six men who met the Eagle Pass detail fifty miles to the west. He had practically been exiled, for although the detail of unlisted men was changed every three weeks, he had been kept here for five months from his family and friends, in the most God-forsaken place imaginable, — twenty-one miles from the nearest house, no shade whatever, and with drinking water that had to be strained through the teeth. When I met him he was a physical wreck. He had dysentery and had lost nearly sixty pounds. He was so nervous that he could scarcely lift a cup to his lips. His only complaint was that there had been no fighting or attempt to cross the border upon his patrol to relieve the monotony. With the exception of a man who passed the fifth of each month in an automobile, not one solitary person had been seen. Pepper stated that at times he had grown so nervous he had turned his revolver over to one of his men, not daring to keep it himself. It was a particularly pathetic sight to see this young man, with a taste and fondness for the pleasant things of this world, living here in the desert wilderness with only bacon three times a day and nothing but bad smelling alkali water to silence the thirst that followed.

He was as glad to see me as a brother and talked for

A PONTOON BRIDGE TRAIN

hours about God's country with tears in his eyes. He asked about current events, the theaters, the men at San Antonio, all in detail. I felt sorry when I left Pepper, and I am told that he has since been retired on account of his health, with three-quarter pay.

Enlisted men were not allowed to cross the border in their uniform, and commanding officers in most cases preferred that the officers should not do so, and their wishes were respected.

Most of the Mexican border cities have race tracks, gambling tables, cock fights and lotteries, with a bull-fight every Sunday. A well-filled cartridge belt with a couple of automatics command more respect than Uncle Sam's uniform, unless it is equally well backed up.

Ciudad Porfirio Diaz, or Padris Nuadris, as it is now called, had just been taken by the insurrectos when I arrived, and the international bridge was gay with flags, flowers and bunting. All business and public work were suspended and the entire city awaited the arrival of the victorious general. Political refugees, who for months or even years had not stepped on their country's soil, paraded the streets and sidewalks and greeted their friends. Troops of insurgent cavalry, made up of boys and wrinkled, gray-haired men, guarded the approaches to the city. Their horses and arms were in excellent shape, but their hats and clothing plainly showed the hard usage consequent to a long campaign over the cactus-covered plains and mountains. They were a strange looking lot with indescribable uniform. Every man carried three to four, and some-

times five, revolvers, two cartridge belts about the waist, and two others across the shoulders, a carbine and a sabre, and about the great white hat many wore a band on which was written "Viva la Madero." General Navarro, an old man broken in health and spirit, was in Diaz at the time with four hundred and ninety-one soldiers, the remnant of the Mexican army that opposed Madero at Juarez. Many of the officers and enlisted men were just able to leave the hospital.

There was more or less bad feeling existing between these bodies of men, and street fights were constantly to be seen. The writer was looked upon with more or less suspicion on both sides.

One day I met and was introduced to Miguel Ahumada, for many years Governor of Chihuahua, and his secretary, Colonel Antonio Ramos Cadena. They had been ousted from office by the change in political affairs of Mexico and were on their way to their homes. Ahumada had always been very popular. His visit was always a fiesta time, but even his popularity could not stem the tide against Diaz.

Nearly all the border towns are alike. Most of them are dirty, unattractive places only interesting for their strange and foreign appearance. The streets are largely long lines of grayish walls of the low flat-roofed adobe houses with heavily barred windows and doorways. The streets are narrow and the sidewalks are so small that one is constantly obliged to step into the street to get along. The market place is as a rule unsanitary; the meats are left exposed to the sun and

flies. Many of the houses, however, have beautiful courts, and often the ugliest walls are found to hide the gayest of gardens with fountains, parrots and singing birds. But to one from the states, the northern border of Mexico is a dirty, dreary place, and when you read glowing accounts of it you can make up your mind that it's only the conception of a poet who has never visited it.

OFFICIAL REPORTS ON TEXAS MANEUVERS

THE detailing of National Guard officers to the Regular Army maneuvers proved highly profitable. In most cases the officers detailed from the various states were men of unusual intelligence, men of long service, and graduates of the Service School, and men who had the time and ability to impart the knowledge which they received to their brother officer upon their return.

The following copies of official reports made to their respective adjutant-generals by Captain Harry Kramer, of New Jersey, and Captain John J. Bolger, of Illinois, give a good illustration of the observations made by the National Guard officers while with the regulars.

CAMDEN, N. J., July 20, 1911.

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Trenton, N. J.

SIR: I have the honor to report that pursuant to General Orders No. 13, The Adjutant-General's Office, Trenton, N. J., Series 1911, I reported to the Division Adjutant-General of the Maneuver Division of the United States Army at San Antonio, Texas, on Saturday, May 27, 1911. By him I was ordered to report to the commanding officer of the 13th Infantry, U. S. A., which I did through the brigade adjutant of the 2d Brigade. I was immediately assigned to the de-

partment of the quartermaster of the regiment, with whom I remained during my tour of duty.

To make a report of what the army did while I was with it would simply require a quotation of the various army publications on drill regulations, field service regulations, etc., etc., and I am therefore limited to impressions received by me.

An attempt was made to give our detail of officers a systematic course of lectures and tactical walks, but this plan failed by reason of an order which moved the division to Leon Springs, where maneuvers by troops were possible on a large scale.

Before leaving for the Springs we had plenty of time, however, to study the army's method of drilling its men to the high standard which they have attained, and this can be stated in the few words "keeping everlastingly at it." Beginning with the recruit the soldier is taught his duties firmly and kindly, and is kept at his work till he masters it; everything is done in cadence, and cadence is sung to the men with every movement. On the march, halted — every movement is counted until the soldier fairly learns to live in cadence. It gives a precision and snap to the drill of the regular which is envied by the National Guardsman, but which is within his grasp if he will but follow his professional brother.

In the particular department to which I was assigned I was particularly impressed with the transportation question. All other matters such as drawing forage, clothing, supplies of all kinds, is the same as in any other business, easily learned by men of intelligence; but the transportation question is one which requires study, thought and wit.

To begin with, an army quartermaster is the custodian of approximately one hundred mules, forty horses, twenty-three wagons, a blacksmith shop;

harness sufficient to handle this equipment, and a body of teamsters who are not enlisted, over whom he has but a nominal control but upon whom he relies to keep everything the regiment needs immediately behind it at all times. I would respectfully recommend that should opportunity offer to again give the officers of the National Guard an opportunity to see the army at work, that all quartermasters be sent to observe this most important department.

I know of no department of the army which overshadows our National Guard, and places it in the unfortunate light of unpreparedness with which it is regarded by our people than in the Quartermaster Department. The army can get up and go because it has the well-trained means at hand, while a National Guard regiment is floundering about trying to get started. Every regiment of this state should be provided with at least one wagon to a company, one to each battalion headquarters and one to the band and regimental headquarters; and it should be a part of each organization's preparedness to keep in close touch with the necessary mule teams for motive power, and teamsters to handle them. When the various regular regiments left their posts a thousand miles away from San Antonio their wagons left with them, and when they reached their destination they moved into camp in proper order. The New Jersey regiments would lay in the heat or storm for hours until they could borrow wagons, etc.

I would respectfully recommend the adoption by the state of the mounted orderly idea. These men in the army are taught scouting and reconnoitering, are attached to various mounted officers in the field and are simply invaluable. With the mounted scouts in its front and a machine gun platoon in the rear a regiment of infantry is indeed a vigorous fighting unit.

The institution of such an idea in the National Guard would draw to the ranks a class of men who love the atmosphere in which the scout lives, and would be another step towards encouraging the men in the ranks to strive for something always ahead of them. Mounted duty is fascinating to the average young man, and his study during the year would be increased for the prospect of a week in the saddle at the annual camp. These men would take up map reading and scouting during the year, and would soon prove themselves able soldiers. This idea would require a small appropriation for horse hire at camps, and such other equipment as they might require.

The anxiety with which the army endeavors to teach the enlisted man the knowledge of first aid to the injured might well be imitated in the National Guard. It would prove of interest to the men, and a break in their round of drills if the assistant surgeons of their battalions would, say twice in a drill season, prepare a lecture upon this subject, having provided by the state a suitable supply of packages, and let the men learn by practical illustration the great worth of this most important duty of a soldier. The work of the National Guardsman must be made varied to interest him, and lectures of this sort would be advantageous.

The new square tents for enlisted men are a great improvement over the old Sibley round tent, inasmuch as they give the eight men who occupy them much better opportunities to arrange their cots and live comfortably, giving to each man his share of the ventilation. I believe these tents should be drawn whenever the state makes requisition for new canvas.

While our detail was at San Antonio, the division was ordered to Leon Springs, where the government has a large reservation for military purposes. This

place is about twenty-eight miles from the permanent camp at San Antonio; it was made on the outward march in two marches, each starting very early in the morning. The camp ground at the Springs was a splendid one for the purpose, just about what would be expected by an army on the march. It was surrounded with a country splendidly adapted to maneuvers which were conducted each week during our stay. All work was done in the mornings, and the men were allowed to rest during the intense heat of the afternoons, when clerical or other duties were performed. This method of allotting a day's work at Sea Girt or other state camps in the summer season is respectfully recommended to the attention of the proper authorities.

On June 7th, the division received orders to move as a unit that night marching through to San Antonio in one march. This was accomplished in approximately thirteen hours, the men finishing in splendid condition, though not intensely enthusiastic over their performance. The trails were dusty and the night was hot, or did not seem to be as cool as usual, and it was a long, hard pull. Each National Guard officer was directed to remain with his organization, and it fell to my lot to march with the last element of the baggage train, the Thirteenth being the last organization in the column. The experience was interesting in showing the position of the officers in the quartermaster's department, when on a march of this character, their duties being to keep the trains tightly closed up on the column. None of the animals received a drop of water in the entire march.

The National Guard officers were shown every courtesy by officers and enlisted men of the Regular Service. Inspection trips were made to the field hospitals and division bakeries, and officers who were

alert found much to interest them which cannot be made the subjects of a report, but of incalculable benefit in the everyday life of a militia regiment. The methods of the army, the ease with which difficulties are met and surmounted; the treatment of the enlisted men by the officers; the encouragement of the men by the officers; the effort to make each other comfortable in the field, are all matters which have come under the eyes of the detailed National Guardsman, and must have left in their minds a deep impression and a knowledge of how to do things should the time ever require it. Officers were present from a great many states; many were anxious as to their treatment by the army officers; others dreaded the contact as they might if going into some critical examination as to their knowledge of military affairs, but in almost every case they left San Antonio delighted with their experience. The regular officers were splendid in their treatment of their fellow officers of the National Guard. The National Guard colonel was treated as a colonel by the army, and each man was given the courtesies of his rank by his juniors in the army. Every one seemed eager at all times to impart the information, and there was a genial spirit which speaks well for the growing friendliness of the two branches of the service. It was my good fortune to be assigned to a regiment whose officers outdid themselves in their efforts to make us comfortable and make our stay profitable.

The results of the experiment of the War Department in sending National Guard officers into a Regular Army camp will be far reaching in their benefits. As far as I could observe there was established a fine fellow-feeling between the regular and citizen soldier. The guardsman must have been impressed with the personnel of the army, with its high standard of officers, and its ever-growing efficiency, recognizing in the life

of the regular a high profession requiring constant study and application; while the regular, in turn, saw many busy men, successful in their chosen walks of life, sacrifice their business interests and journeying thousands of miles to gain an insight into the life of a soldier, perhaps at a considerable loss from a financial point of view, each serving a common country.

In conclusion, I can but say that upon leaving the army I was more than ever impressed with the importance of the National Guard as a factor in the defense of the nation. The army, at best, is but a handful of men and the quarter million National Guardsmen must be the nucleus of the army of the future.

I believe, therefore, as a result of my observations, that the National Guard can be made into a splendid, serviceable corps of defense, and if the old adage that "if anything is worth doing at all it is worth doing well," is at all true, then the National Guard is worth all that is now being spent upon it, and more. It should be properly equipped and instructed; some compensation should be given to its members; and every effort made to raise it in the respect of our people; in fact, so well should it be nurtured by our state and national government that membership in it should be made an honor, and the youth of our land encouraged to aspire to membership in it.

Very respectfully,

HARRY KRAMER,

Captain, New Jersey N. G.,

Regimental QM.

CHICAGO, ILL., June 15, 1911.

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL, State of Illinois,

Springfield, Illinois.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report:

In accordance with Special Orders No. 53, dated Adjutant-General's Office, Springfield, Ill., May 13, 1911, I reported to Major-General Carter, Maneuver Division Camp, Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas, at 8.30 A.M., Saturday, May 27, 1911.

Thence to the muster officer, and was assigned to the 13th Infantry.

Reported to Colonel Loughborough, Commanding 13th Infantry. Was assigned to Company "A," 2d Lieut. Courtney H. Hodges commanding, Captain Wygant of Company "A" in command of 1st Battalion.

A tent was set apart for my use and the officers of the 13th Infantry were very kind and most courteous.

On Saturday, May 27, 1911, there was a review of the entire division by Major-General Carter, and the sight was inspiring. The troops show the effect of careful training and instruction, and their physical appearance is particularly perfect. Every organization has a large number of recruits who are fast becoming soldiers, due to the constant instruction and drilling by their officers. The transportation of the division was well nigh perfect, both wagons and animals in excellent condition.

On Monday, May 29th, company drill, extended order and then bayonet exercise — this from 7 A.M. until 10 A.M., with frequent rests.

At 10 A.M. lecture by 1st Lieutenant Joseph L. Topham, on the care of the rifle. He particularly emphasized to avoid knotty stocks, cleaning from the

muzzle, although the present cleaning rod is not of sufficient length to allow proper cleaning from the breech. Lieutenant Topham was a member of the Army Rifle Team, winners of the National Match at Camp Perry, and is ably qualified to instruct in the care and use of the rifle. His lecture was instructive and interesting.

May 31st, company drill, bayonet exercise, skirmish and signal drill from 7 A.M. to 10 A.M. with frequent rests. 10.30 A.M., lecture by Major-Surgeon John Murtagh, 13th Infantry.

Subjects:

Camp Sanitation.
Field Hospital.
First Aid Dressing Stations.
Base Hospital.
Evacuation Hospital.
Use of First Aid Packet.
Vaccination for Small Pox.
Anti-Typhoid Serum to protect against Typhoid Fever.
Care of Sinks.
Burning all Refuse, both Solids and Liquids.

June 1st, company drill, bayonet exercise, skirmish and squad drills, frequent rests, 7 A.M. to 10 A.M. 10.05 A.M., Tactical Walk, under direction Major Winn, 13th Infantry, problem, outpost duty. Thanks to the lessons given to our regiment by Major Walsh, 11th Cavalry, and Captain E. V. D. Murphy, 27th Infantry, during the past few years, my answers were correct.

1 P.M. visited the division bakery where all of the bread for the division is baked. Captain L. R. Holbrook is in charge, and he has made a deep and exhaustive study of the organization, personnel and equipment of the bakery, and is quoted as the best posted authority on this work. He has made a spe-

cialty on "FIELD BREAD," which retains its freshness from ten days to two weeks, or longer, a receipt of which I attach hereto. I do not believe there is a commercial bakery in the world as clean or efficient as the division bakery under Captain Holbrook.

June 2d, 1st call 3.30 A.M., assembly 4.50 A.M. On the march at 5 A.M. Arrived at so-called "11 Mile Hill" at 9.30 A.M., and bivouacked there until following morning.

Saturday, June 3d, first call 4.30 A.M., assembly 5.30 A.M. On the march at 5.35 A.M. Arrived at Well No. 5, Leon Springs Reservation, at 10.20 A.M. Weather exceedingly hot, but all troops in good condition. Bivoucked and rested for balance of day.

Monday, June 5th, maneuver by the division, 13th Infantry on the defensive. This maneuver for the particular benefit of the various staff organizations; it was also interesting for the subordinate officers. Owing to the unfortunate shortage of officers, it was impossible to obtain copy of the problem. Nearly all officers are doing double and triple duty and the non-commissioned staff are overloaded with work.

Tuesday, June 6th, 6.30 A.M., outpost problem by 13th Infantry assisted by the machine gun platoon.

Companies were relieved each hour to give all of them instruction. Patrols and scouting parties were sent out, and as the country is topographically ideal for this work, the lesson proved highly instructive and interesting.

Sketching is done usually by junior 2d lieutenants or non-commissioned officers, who are properly qualified.

Five to ten rounds of blank cartridges issued to troops in all the maneuvers.

Back to camp at 11.30 A.M. Troops rested balance of day.

Wednesday, June 7th, 6.30 A.M., division maneuvers. This approached the lesson of Monday, June 5th. Back to Camp 11.25 A.M. Troops rested balance of day.

Thursday, June 8th, lecture by Lieutenant L. M. Powell, 13th Infantry, commanding machine gun platoon, on the use and care of machine guns, mules, and manner of packing the latter to avoid sore backs and sore spots. Lieutenant Powell is the inventor of a number of improvements both for handling the guns and packing on mules. I am reliably informed that he has had his platoon get into action in thirty seconds or less, which means unpacking mules, mounting guns and firing one shot from the belt. Lieutenant Powell is accounted as the best machine gun commander in the army.

At 11 A.M. we received orders to have everything ready at 1 P.M. for the wagons, as the brigade would make a night march to the permanent camp at San Antonio.

On the march at 6 P.M. Delays were frequent, on account of other brigades in front. Roads were very dusty, weather exceedingly warm and no breeze. Arrived at Braunells at midnight. Allowed one hour for luncheon and rest. Resumed march at 1 A.M., and arrived at Division Maneuver Camp, Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, at 5.20 A.M., June 9th. Troops were in good condition, but of course very tired.

During my stop I was particularly impressed by the sanitation of the camps and the absence of flies. Sinks were burned out daily with straw and petroleum, the seats were scrubbed, and the inside treated with a heavy coat of unslaked lime. All refuse from the kitchens, both solids and liquids, are burned in the field ranges or in the fireplaces.

The army is equipped with a new field range, which

AFTER MARCHING AND SLEEPING FOR FORTY-EIGHT HOURS IN A DRIVING RAIN THESE MILITIA ARE HAVING AMMUNITION ISSUED THEM FOR AN ALL-DAY BATTLE

is much lighter and more efficient than the range we are equipped with in Illinois. I would recommend that we be equipped with the new range at the earliest possible date.

The health of the men should be the first consideration of the officers. The inoculation of every man with the anti-typhoid serum is without any doubt an absolute preventative of the scourge of all camps, typhoid fever. I would recommend that this state procure through the medical department enough of this serum and administer same, free of charge, to every member of the Illinois National Guard.

As the protection is good from at least eight years, you can readily see it would add to our efficiency in case of field service, besides protecting in civil life.

I understand we have no hospital tentage or equipment, and that there is at Washington a full equipment for each state, all ready to be issued. I would recommend that requisition be made for a complete equipment for hospitals for the Illinois Division.

Our first aid packets are obsolete and we should be equipped with the latest packets, and I so recommend.

We should be armed with the latest pattern of the RIFLE, as we have our men instructed in its use and care. I do not hesitate to say that in the 7th Infantry we have not to exceed fifty accurate rifles. The U. S. Army can reject and condemn, and there is no reason why we should not do likewise. The regiment will some day be called into service, and it should have a fair show against an enemy. The present equipment of rifles will not allow our soldier an even chance for his life.

The machine gun platoons are a valuable adjunct to a regiment, and I understand provision has already been made to equip every regiment with such a platoon. I would recommend that the latter be made the 13th

Company in each regiment, its equipment increased to six guns, which provides two for each battalion, and would allow three platoons, each under command of a commissioned officer.

The question of proper shoes is a perplexing one. The army marching shoe is really not the best that could be made, still it answers the purpose much better than ordinary shoes would.

Shoes were issued to the 7th Infantry three years ago, and they are practically worn out. Still the officers are held accountable for them. The members of the National Guard should surely be allowed to purchase the government shoes, both marching and garrison, at the same price they are sold to the enlisted men of the army. I believe it can be done without much trouble.

You will note that the army, which is in perfect physical condition, is worked from 7 A.M. to 10, and rarely later than 11.30 A.M., and the balance of the day up to retreat is allowed to the man for rest and recreation. Details are reduced to the lowest possible minimum.

Contrast this with the usual manner in which the National Guard is handled at camp and maneuvers, where an effort is made to crowd into six days all the work that was taught in the previous years.

Transportation is a subject that should receive the earnest attention of our state at the earliest possible date.

I believe a wagon can be devised that would be superior to the army wagon. The new wagon should be equipped with Timkin roller bearings with a five-inch tire, allowing heavier loads with no further strain on the animals. I would consider it a great step forward if sufficient wagons could be obtained to supply the Illinois division. Enough mules could be purchased

and kept employed in the state service, as at Camp Logan, grading, filling, etc., at a small expense to state. These mules would always be in condition and ready for field service. Same applies as well for the machine gun mules and the pack train.

We would have Illinois then prepared for any emergency and in the front rank, where it belongs.

I noted that all enlisted men at the maneuver camp were supplied with "Gold Medal" cots. I recommend that our organizations be so supplied.

The aeroplanes proved interesting, and without doubt will be of great value in future armed conflicts. They are in the experimental stage, however, and a recommendation would be out of place.

It is almost impossible to write all of one's observations and a great many of the minor details will doubtless prove of service to me in the future.

The officers of the 13th Infantry were very kind, courteous, sociable, and gave information cheerfully, and were indeed most agreeable. The friendly attitude of the army officers at San Antonio, as well as their teachings and example, will undoubtedly prove of great value to the officers of the National Guard.

Personally, I derived great benefit from my tour at the Maneuver Camp, and I desire to express to you my sincere appreciation for the assignment.

Very respectfully,

JOHN J. BOLGER,

Captain 7th Inf., I. N. G.,

Commanding Company "F"

WHY THE TEXAS MANEUVERS WERE BENEFICIAL

THE real purpose of the recent great assemblage of troops in Texas, aside from international considerations, was the creation of one military unit, and that was accomplished for the first time since the civil war.

Five times the cost of its operation would not measure the value to the country of the experiment, declared General Carter, the commander-in-chief of the maneuver division, upon his return north.

It is the first opportunity that the modern army has had to get together all branches of service; the infantry, the cavalry, the artillery, the transportation and subsistence departments, and to make a thorough test of what has been purely theoretical estimates of the proper balance between them.

As might have been expected, it was soon found that there was need for readjustment of the relative strength of the various branches to make one perfect whole.

The problem was worked out by the test of actual practice and before General Carter left Texas there had been brought into being the military unit which had been so long desired by army strategists.

For many years army officers have advocated a system of concentration of troops. They want to see

the widely scattered army posts discarded and the army redistributed in a few large brigade or even division centers in the neighborhood of great cities, where there are facilities for training and discipline on a large scale.

At present the army is thinly distributed over the whole country in regimental, battalion and even troop establishments, widely separated and conducted under conditions admitting of no genuine military progress. For the practice or even the advantageous study of the problems of war there is little opportunity. Brigades are broken up into fragments and regiments are seldom kept intact. The men acquire indifferent knowledge of maneuvers. It may be said, indeed, that the army is now so distributed as to prevent the purpose for which it is intended, and it might safely be added that so long as we continue this arrangement we shall have no army at all in any proper sense of the word. The widespread arrangement of our forts and army posts was originally necessary on account of Indian disturbances. To-day it seems to serve no purpose other than that of making markets for the hucksters and the liquor dealers.

Along this line the speech made by the Hon. Jas. McLachlan, of California, on the inefficiency of our army, just previous to the Texas maneuvers, is worth quoting in part:

"The defenseless condition of our Pacific coast has been a matter of common world knowledge for years. Such a condition would naturally suggest that in-

sufficient military appropriations have been made by Congress to provide for an adequate national defense. But the enormity of our appropriations for military preparation clearly and convincingly show that parsimonious legislation is not responsible for the existing condition of unpreparedness. The remaining deductions, then, are that moneys purposed to place the army in a state of preparedness are either being diverted from their legislative purpose or are being extravagantly expended. . . . We are spending enough money on our army to have a highly efficient and numerically stronger force than we are maintaining at present. Without in any way reflecting on either the commissioned or enlisted personnel, I charge that our army is wretchedly unorganized and extravagantly administered; that it is in no sense a modern military force, and that it is unprepared to fight, which is the final function of an army. I also believe that if we were to spend a billion dollars per annum upon the army under its present malorganization, we would still be without an efficient military force. . . . We have before us a military condition which would not be tolerated in any other country of the world. We are spending approximately $100,000,000 per annum for our alleged army. Our enlisted personnel, owing principally to their time being occupied in caring for useless and extravagant posts, are not being trained in the attributes of a soldier; our officers, from lieutenants of the line to general officers, are without practical field training. We have regiments which have not been

assembled for regimental drills in years. We have colonels who have never seen their titular commands assembled. Our general officers have never seen a real properly balanced field command. We have regiments in command of captains, battalions in commands of lieutenants, and companies in command of sergeants. . . . I again charge, and I again challenge denial, that the mobile army is almost entirely deficient in field training and that it is entirely unprepared to take the field.

"Thoughtless denial may come from the uninformed; I do not anticipate denial from the army itself nor from those who know. I think it a conservative estimate, an estimate based on the testimony of those who are daily witnesses to the nonmilitary dispersion of the military appropriations, that an entire and thorough reorganization of the army along modern military lines will save approximately $20,000,000 per annum and will increase the efficiency of the army at least two hundred per cent.

" Under the present intolerable malorganization of the army the troops in the military departments are in no measure apportioned among the posts with any regard to the proportion of the several arms, so that in case of emergency a properly balanced and complemented military force could be placed in the field; nor are they stationed with any regard to the mobilization of the entire army in time of war. The troops are scattered in nontactical commands with the sole view of caring for useless and costly properties erected as political tribute

"A field army, when one could finally be assembled, would be intrusted in time of war to one of our general officers. There is not a general officer in the United States Army who has ever been privileged by his government to even see such a force assembled. Wherein, then, lies his competency to command? Denied peace-time training, our officers must be more than human to competently lead their men in time of war. To place an untrained military force in the field constitutes governmental murder. Our stupendous pension rolls, carrying the names of thousands maimed or sacrificed through governmental delinquency and military incompetency, we point to as evidence of a nation's gratitude; while, in fact, our pension rolls constitute mere mercenary atonement for the needless sacrifice of life which has marked every year in which we have engaged. Until our army is placed under a tactical organization which will give the officers and men opportunity to equip themselves for the requirements of war, we will in the future, as we have in the past, amalgamate huge armies of untutored levies with an unprepared Regular Army and again sacrifice thousands of lives and encumber our posterity with a pension roll of crushing proportions. The 'divisional' organization will largely correct the existing evils in our military establishment. With this organization, the farcical military departments can be eliminated. Each division can be stationed within a certain territorial zone, to be established by the military authorities, and at stated intervals can be assembled for maneuvers, de-

signed to give the officers and men actual field training. Until that time arrives, when the army is considered seriously and is recognized as a military force which some day may be called upon to sustain the national honor, and legislation is enacted to place the army upon a real military basis, all military appropriations constitute a criminal waste of funds. We are neither giving the army nor the taxpayer a square deal. In fairness to both the army should be either entirely reorganized or immediately disbanded."

As Mr. McLachlan says, the conditions he speaks of are known to army officers who for years have advocated the changes he recommends. The secretary of war in his annual report to the President in December, 1911, declared that the United States was totally unprepared for war with any first-class power.

He attributed this largely to the fact that the army was "scattered out over the country" in too many posts, and to a lack of reserves. The army on the peace footing habitually maintained, with miniature companies and troops, he characterized as ineffective for any serious war service.

As to the unpreparedness of the army in artillery and ammunition, Secretary Stimson says that "at the present rate of appropriation it is estimated that it would take more than fifty years to secure a reasonable supply of field artillery guns, carriages and ammunition that would be necessary in the event of war."

The report says that at a conservative estimate the expense per effective rifleman in the United States

Army is between two and five times as much as any first-class power on the continent of Europe. This comparison is made after excluding from consideration the higher pay and better subsistence that American soldiers receive. This fact is stated as an illustration, Secretary Stimson declares, of the extravagance of the existing system of wide distribution of any army.

John Adams said, "The national defense is one of the cardinal duties of a statesman." But the politician, in order to reach his own selfish ambition, often overlooks the fact. Our army, as to size, is a joke to the nations of the world. There are countries, one rarely reads of, with larger armies than ours. A country of 90,000,000 people and 3,602,990 square miles to protect, with an army of less than 60,000 and a secondary defense of only 120,000. Following is a chart showing the military strength, population and area to protect of European powers.

Classes	Germany	France	Italy	Austria-Hungary	Russia	Great Britain	Turkey
Population.....	52,000,000	59,000,000	29,000,000	41,000,000	113,000,000	381,000,000	33,000,000
Area sq. miles	211,108	3,127,856	110,665	201,591	8,644,100	11,335,806	1,652,533
Active Army Officers	26,800	23,892	18,460	17,300	28,416	4,572	9,512
Non-com. Officers and Men.....	1,921,200	2,000,000	711,614	859,311	1,116,600	153,988	192,615
First Reserve Officers	22,160	18,192	17,000	16,600	18,600	138,000	320,000
Non-com. Officers and Men.....	2,002,440	733,600	510,000	332,000	2,513,476		
Non-combatants Second Reserve Offic's	18,960	18,857	17,982	22,654	17,655	274,074	400,000
Non-combatant Officers and Men	823,332	803,000	739,400	476,444	1,219,440		
Grand War Total Officers	67,920	60,941	53,242	46,554	64,671	570,634	922,127
Non-combatant Officers and Men	4,746,972	3,539,600	1,961,014	1,667,755	4,849,516		

With the great mass of people who neither have time nor inclination to study the requirements of military science, no error is more common than to mistake military resources for military strength.

As Homer Lee points out in the "Valor of Ignorance," we are an unmilitary nation, rich and arrogant. Wealth is no safeguard against a well-organized and determined foe and arbitration is an illusion. No nation offers more numerous opportunities for invasion by a foreign nation than does the United States, whenever the cause is sufficiently great to induce preparations that will beat aside our naval resistance. China has reaped the logical reward of "peace at any price." Major-General Story, U. S. A. (retired), makes the assertion that in the event of war with Japan she could within three months land on the Pacific coast four hundred thousand troops and seize, with only insignificant resistance, Seattle, Portland, San Francisco and Los Angeles. A barrier of mountains and deserts makes the defense of the Pacific slope an easy matter against attack from the east and only from that direction could the United States hope to capture its lost territory except by sea expedition. A soldier cannot be created by the stroke of a pen or by the impulse of enthusiastic valor; it takes a score of men and years of training to make one fit for the performance of duty, and the modern war will seldom endure that time. War training and material cannot be purchased in the open market at any price.

Our army has not been increased as the country has

grown. We are like a poor man who goes into an unsettled district and builds a hut to live in, he marries, becomes well-to-do, has a family, begins to have neighbors, roads are built about him, he has no room to entertain friends and strangers who visit him, yet he refuses to enlarge his place because, as he argues, it was large enough when it was built, so it must be large enough to-day.

If the American people will not allow their army to be increased then they must depend upon the militia, and instead of being prone to criticize and ridicule, should do what they can to help its efficiency by enlisting or encouraging enlistment. The presence of a well-trained militia is a standing guarantee of peace at home and abroad. The disorderly elements of society tacitly recognize that behind the law, and prepared to enforce it, is an organization of devoted and well-conditioned men, who will accept any hazard which the preservation of law and order may demand. With the nations of Europe equipped with enormous standing armies, and with the races of the far East in a state of ferment, of which the outcome can hardly be predicted, the folly of not keeping the American militia up to the highest possible standard of effectiveness is monumental indeed.

The Organized Militia is no longer considered by the government a kind of State Police Force. It is the secondary force of the United States Army for national defense.

The chief enemies of the National Guard are people

who really know nothing of its work or serious self-sacrificing effort, who sit comfortably at home or ride about in automobiles at the front and criticize unimportant details. When these people see an article of ridicule or an attack on the Organized Militia their unmagnified military intellect will not permit them to challenge its truth, and, as a rule, they accept the criticisms as true.

Some people simply misunderstand the National Guard and do not intentionally misrepresent it. These are the ones the author hopes to reach, and it is hoped that this book has made it clear; the National Guard is not a club or an organization primarily for pleasure (though much can be derived from serving in it); that it does not injure nor unlawfully interfere with the rights of any one; that it does not take his property under the guise of authority, and that it is not an aggregation of "Tin Soldiers." The militia is not for show or to give its members an opportunity to display a large array of brass buttons; the work, however, is not so harsh nor irksome as to be a burden, and above all it is not an organization under color of which its members may indulge in habits that would not be tolerated in other organizations. It is hoped that this book has shown the absolute necessity of an efficient National Guard; the great need of which has been demonstrated in every war in the history of this country; that it is a department of our government that is coming more and more to be recognized as vitally essential to the future and well-being of this nation;

HOLDING OPEN A RAILROAD LINE UNTIL SUPPLIES HAVE BEEN BROUGHT UP

that it is a military organization, the respective units of which offer in their organizations unlimited opportunities for advancement, improvement and social intercourse as well as pleasure derived from association with live, energetic young men. The National Guard is an organization wherein its members learn self-control, get self-confidence, improve their bodies and develop their minds. It is one means by which can be shown your patriotism to your country, your loyalty to its institutions, and by which you can repay in a measure what you owe for its protection and the liberty you enjoy. As "Arms and the Man" has said:

"A man who serves his country in time of war is noble, brave and patriotic, but that a man shall properly prepare himself in time of peace to serve in war is all these things and more. It is noble, with a nobility which is real not ideal. It is brave, with a bravery which assumes in time of unemotional peace many burdens, among them that of bearing lack of appreciation of those who do not consider military preparation or training necessary."

Every young man should serve at least one enlistment in the Regular Army or the National Guard, he owes it to his country. It is his duty to be prepared should his nation need his service. It is not enough to be willing to volunteer when war is declared, it is one's duty to know how to take care of himself and take command of men; no one is exempt. There is work connected with the National Guard, but also a vast amount of healthy, honest sport which will improve

the mind as well as the body. Unlimited opportunity is given for target shooting (the cleanest and best sport in the world), and a companionship exists among soldiers such as can be found nowhere else. The Dick Bill had killed the "Tin Soldier"; long live the National Guard.

APPENDIX

HISTORY AND STATISTICS OF THE MILITIA

CONGRESS recommended on the eighteenth of July, 1775, to the people of the United English colonies that all able-bodied, effective men between the ages of sixteen and fifty years of age be formed into companies of militia to consist of one captain, two lieutenants, one ensign, four sergeants, four corporals, one clerk, one drummer, one fifer, and fifty-eight privates. The officers to be chosen by their respective companies. These companies were formed into regiments, each with one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, two majors, one adjutant and one quartermaster. All officers above the rank of captain were appointed by the committees of safety. The militia could only be called out with the consent of the state legislatures; Congress also provided that one-fourth of the militia in every colony be selected as minutemen, from those who volunteered, and that they be ready at short notice to march to any place when their assistance was required for the defense of their own or neighboring colony. This was the first scheme of mobilization in this country.

The following table, submitted to Congress by the secretary of war in 1790, shows the number of troops furnished by the states during the year 1776:

States	No. of men on Continental pay	No. of Militia	Total Militia and Continentals
New Hampshire	3,019	.....	3,019
Massachusetts	13,372	4,000	17,372
Rhode Island	798	1,102	1,900
Connecticut	6,390	5,737	12,127
Delaware	609	145	754
Maryland	637	2,592	3,229
Virginia	6,181	.....	6,181
North Carolina	1,134	.....	1,134
South Carolina	2,069	.....	2,069
Georgia	351	.....	351
New York	3,629	1,715	5,344
Pennsylvania	5,519	4,876	10,395
New Jersey	3,193	5,893	9,086
Total	46,901	26,060	72,961

In August, 1794, troubles arose in western Pennsylvania in regard to the enforcement of the revenue laws of the United States, and it was made manifest that civil officers, unsupported by military force, are not always able to keep peace. With the motto "Liberty and no excise," malcontents assembled in arms to the number of seven thousand, and refusing to disperse, pursuant to a proclamation of the President (later), he was obliged to call upon the governors of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia for fifteen thousand militia, no regular troops being available. The quotas asked for were promptly furnished, except by Pennsylvania, where the militia were unreliable, through sympathy with their rebellious fellow-citizens; but when the governors of the states, who marched at the heads of their troops, reached the scene of the troubles the insurgents were induced to disperse without bloodshed, another argument for nationalization or federalization.

McMaster says, "The militia called into service during the year 1812 numbered 49,187, of whom 208 were from Massachusetts and none from Connecticut, adding to these were 10,000 regulars, newly enlisted and without training." During this war our navy accomplished wonders, but our land forces were a burlesque, and but for England having her hands full with her war on the continent of Europe, the results would have been far different. The lesson held out above all others was that our militia furnished no security at all, they were, however, as good in battle as regulars, with no more training.

The difficulty of recruiting regiments in time of hostilities was shown in this as in all conflicts, and, as Major Steele points out, shows the importance of maintaining a standing army of a size proportionate to our needs and to the population of the country, to serve as a training school for officers and as a nucleus and first line in case of war. In 1845 we went to war with Mexico.

This war grew out of the annexation of Texas and our dispute with Mexico over the boundary line, and, to quote from Steele's "American Campaigns," "Possibly the best incident of the Mexican War from a military point of view of the nation, was the absence of the militia." The next call on the militia was at the outbreak of the Civil War.

In 1861, when President Lincoln called for seventy-five thousand militiamen, the patriotic men of the North rushed to arms in numbers far exceeding the

facilities of the government. The South, of course, refused to send troops to the Union, but did furnish them for the Confederacy.

If Washington's injunction to prepare for war in time of peace had been heeded the civil war would have been a matter of months instead of years. With a standing army of forty thousand disciplined soldiers at the outbreak the government would have made short work of the rebellion. Practically all the federal troops were militia, and were developed into the most efficient fighting armies before the end of the war, yet the average civilian overlooks the fact that our opponents were without an army at the start, and had to build one out of the "whole cloth," giving the Federals a similar opportunity. Also that during the first year both Northern and Southern armies were little more than armed mobs composed of individually brave and patriotic men. Neither side would have had any show against a much smaller, properly trained and organized force. The futile efforts of the brave, desperate and highly patriotic Frenchmen in 1871 conclusively demonstrates this. Conditions continued unchanged with the militia until the Spanish War.

The events of "'98" are too fresh in mind to go into details, it is sufficient to say that the militia was totally unprepared, and its record was similar to that of 1812. In every war the militia as such failed because it had not been organized and trained for the long campaigns of a war. After the Spanish War Congress, and the public generally, realized what

military students have long contended, that under a status like that previous to 1898 the militia as such would never be of much practical use in a foreign or other war. To quote from a source so recent as the Encyclopedia Britannica, Edition of 1893: "The National Guard are to a great degree dependent on their own exertion for equipment in all respects save that of mere guns. The soldiers furnish their own uniforms, etc., and the tastes of each particular company in some of the states are consulted as regards the uniforms selected, the result being almost incongruous appearance of the different bodies of troops when, mustered together, they appear even in the same regiment all the colors of the rainbow."

The Dick Bill has changed all this, and to-day the Organized Militia of the United States is fairly well equipped for field service according to the models, patterns, and standards of equipment of the Regular Army. The men for the most part are physically sound and mentally efficient.

The secretary of war is authorized to provide for participation by any part of the Organized Militia of any state or territory, on request of the governor, in the encampment, maneuvers, and field instruction of any part of the Regular Army, at or near any military post or camp, or lake or sea coast defenses of the United States.

The Organized Militia, when so participating, receives the same pay, subsistence and transportation as is provided by law for officers and men of the Regular Army.

The Divisions, Departments, and Troops of the United States Army, on the first day of December, 1911, were as follows;

THE EASTERN DIVISION.— Embracing the Department of the East and the Department of the Gulf; headquarters at Governors Island, N. Y.

Troops not embraced in departments: 10th Inf.

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE EAST.— Embracing the New England States, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, Ohio, the Island of Porto Rico, and the islands and keys adjacent thereto; headquarters at Fort Totten, N. Y.

Troops: 1st Batln. Engrs and Engr. Band; Co. G, Sig. Corps; 10th, and Hdqrs. and 1st Squad. 15th Cav.; 2d Batln., 3d Field Art.; 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 12th, 14th, 17th, 21st, 24th, 35th, 36th, 40th, 41st, 43d, 44th, 45th, 46th, 47th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 52d, 53d, 54th, 55th, 56th, 58th, 59th, 69th, 58th, 73d, 76th, 81st, 82d, 83d, 84th, 87th, 88th, 89th, 96th, 97th, 98th, 100th, 101st, 102d, 103d, 104th, 107th, 109th, 110th, 112th, 113th, 114th, 117th, 118th, 119th, 120th, 122d, 123d, 124th, 125th, 129th, 130th, 131st, 132d, 133d, 134th, 135th, 136th, 137th, 139th, 140th, 141st, 143d, 151st, 152d, 153d, 154th, 155th, 156th, 157th, 165th, 166th, 167th, 168th, and 169th Cos., Coast Art.; 2d, 4th, 5th 7th, 10th 11th, 12th,

and 13th Bands, Coast Art.; 5th, 24th, and 29th Inf., and Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry.

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF.— Embracing the states of North Carolina, South Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and the Artillery Districts of New Orleans and Galveston; headquarters at Atlanta, Ga.

Troops: 15th, 16th, 19th, 20th, 22d, 31st, 39th, 72d, 74th, 75th, 77th, 78th, 79th, 80th, 91st, 99th, 111th, 116th, 121st, 127th, 128th, 144th, 145th, 162d, 163d, 164th, and 170th Cos., Coast Art.; 1st, 8th, and 14th Bands, Coast Art.

THE CENTRAL DIVISION.— Embracing the Department of the Lakes, the Department of the Missouri, the Department of Texas, and the military reservations of Fort D. A. Russell, Wyoming; Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and Fort Riley, Kansas; headquarters at Chicago, Ill.

Troops: not embraced in depts. I. K, and M, Engrs., Field Hospital and Ambulance Co. No. 1; Ambulance Co. No. 3; D. Sig. Corps; 9th and 13th Cav. and 2d Squad., 15th Cav.; 4th, E, 5th, and 6th Field Art., and 11th Inf.

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE LAKES.— Embracing the states of Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and North Dakota; headquarters at St. Paul, Minn.

Troops: 3d Squad. 15th Cav.; Hdqrs. and D and F, 5th Field Art.; 1st Batln., 14th Inf., and 26th and 27th Inf.

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI.— Embracing the states of Iowa, Missouri, Kansas (except that part included in the military reservations of Fort Leavenworth and Fort Riley), Nebraska, South Dakota, Wyoming (except that part included in the Yellowstone National Park and the military reservation of Fort D. A. Russell), and Colorado; headquarters at Omaha, Neb.

Troops: Cos. A, B, and H, Sig. Corps; Hdqrs., 1st and 2d Squads, 12th Cav.; Hdqrs. and 1st and 2d Batlns., 4th Inf., and Hdqrs., 2d and 3d Batlns., 18th Inf.

THE DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS.— Embracing the states of Texas (except that part included in the Artillery District of Galveston), Louisiana (except that part included in the Artillery District of New Orleans; Arkansas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico Territory) headquarters at San Antonio, Tex.

Troops: L, Engrs.; I, Sig. Corps; 3d, 4th, and 11th Cav.; Hdqrs. and A, B, and C, 3d, and A, B, and C, 5th Field Art.; 3d Batln, 4th Inf., 17th, 22d, 23d, and 28th Inf.

THE WESTERN DIVISION.— Embracing the Department of California and the Department of the Columbia; headquarters at San Francisco, Cal.

THE DEPARTMENT OF CALIFORNIA.— Embracing the states of California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona Territory, and the Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies; headquarters at Fort Miley, Cal.

Troops: Hdqrs, and G, 2d Batln. Engrs.; E and M,

Sig. Corps; Hdqrs. A, B, C, and D, 1st Cav.; 5th and 6th Cav., and 3d Squad., 12th Cav.; Hdqrs. D, E, and F, 1st, and E, 2d Field Art.; 10th, 25th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 32d, 38th, 57th, 60th, 61st, 64th, 65th, 66th, 67th, 68th, 70th, 105th, 115th, 147th, 148th, 158th, 159th, and 161st Cos., Coast Art.; 3d Band, Coast Art.; 2d Inf., 8th Inf., 15th Inf., 1st Batln., 18th Inf., 2d Batln., 20th Inf., and 30th Inf.

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE COLUMBIA.— Embracing the states of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, so much of Wyoming as is included in the Yellowstone National Park, and Alaska; headquarters at Vancouver Barracks, Wash.

Troops: Co. F, 2d Batln. Engrs.; Cos. C and K, Sig. Corps, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, and M, 1st Cav.; Hdqrs. and D and F, 2d Field Art.; 26th, 30th, 33d, 34th, 62d, 63d, 71st, 85th, 92d, 93d, 94th, 106th, 108th, 126th, 149th, 150th, and 160th Cos., Coast Art.; 6th Band, Coast Art.; 1st, 16th, and 25th Inf.; Hdqrs. and 2d and 3d Batlns., 14th Inf.

THE PHILIPPINES DIVISION.— Embracing the Department of Luzon, Department of the Visayas, and Department of Mindanao; headquarters at Manila, P. I.

Troops not embraced in Depts.; Cos. E and H, Engrs.; Field Hospital and Ambulance Co. No. 4; 11th, 13th, 18th, 23d, 42d, 86th, 90th, 95th, 138th, and 142d Cos., and 9th Band, Coast Art.; 36th, 37th, 40th, 44th, and 50th Cos., Philippine Scouts.

THE DEPARTMENT OF LUZON.— Embracing all that

portion of the Philippine Archipelago lying north of a line passing southeastwardly through the West Pass of Apo, or Mindoro Strait, to the twelfth parallel of north latitude; thence east along said parallel to longitude 124 degrees, ten minutes east of Greenwich, but including the Island of Palawan and adjacent small islands, the island of Masbate; thence northerly to and through San Bernardino Straits; headquarters at Manila, P. I.

Troops: Cos. F and L, Sig. Corps; 7th, 8th, and 14th Cav.; A, B, and C, 1st; A, B, and C, 2d Field Art.; 7th, 12th, 13th, and Hdqrs. 1st and 3d Batlns., 20th Inf.; 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 17th, 19th, 20th, 22d, 23d, 25th, 26th, 27th, 32d, 33d, 35th, 38th, 39th, and 41st Cos., Philippine Scouts.

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS.— Embracing all islands of the Philippine Archipelago lying south of the southern boundary line of the Department of Luzon and east of longitude 121 degrees 45 minutes east of Greenwich and north of the ninth parallel of latitude, except the islands of Mindanao, Palawan, and all islands east of the Straits of Surigao; headquarters at Iloilo, P. I.

Troops: 9th and 19th Inf.; 7th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 13th, 16th, 21st, 24th, and 28th Cos., Philippine Scouts.

THE DEPARTMENT OF MINDANAO.— Embracing all islands of the Philippine Archipelago not included in other departments; headquarters at Zamboanga, P. I.

Troops: 2d Cav., 3d, 6th, and 21st Inf.; 12th, 14th, 15th, 18th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 34th, 42d, 43d, 45th, 46th,

47th, 48th, 49th, 51st, and 52d Cos., Philippine Scouts.

The following table gives the number of Organized Militia for each one thousand of male population between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, in the several states and territories and District of Columbia, based on the reports made by adjutants-general of states, territories, and the District of Columbia on January 1, 1910.

Alabama	9.5	Nevada	0.0
Arizona	15.1	New Hampshire	30.1
Arkansas	5.1	New Jersey	7.6
California	9.5	New Mexico	11.1
Colorado	7.2	New York	11.2
Connecticut	20.5	North Carolina	8.1
Delaware	11.7	North Dakota	12.3
District of Columbia	27.6	Ohio	5.7
Florida	4.8	Oklahoma	6.7
Georgia	5.8	Oregon	11.5
Hawaii	71.8	Pennsylvania	9.4
Idaho	20.1	Rhode Island	12.0
Illinois	6.0	South Carolina	8.9
Indiana	3.5	South Dakota	10.8
Iowa	9.4	Tennessee	3.6
Kansas	4.8	Texas	6.0
Kentucky	5.5	Utah	14.3
Louisiana	4.5	Vermont	19.3
Maine	13.1	Virginia	9.8
Maryland	11.5	Washington	5.1
Massachusetts	10.8	West Virginia	7.8
Michigan	4.1	Wisconsin	6.9
Minnesota	12.5	Wyoming	27.8
Mississippi	4.7		
Missouri	5.4	Average for all states, territories, and the District of Columbia	7.7
Montana	14.8		
Nebraska	8.1		

Following is the allotment of funds appropriated by Congress in accordance with section 1661, Revised Statutes, as amended by the act approved June 22, 1906, to the several states, territories, and the District of Columbia for the support of the militia for 1911.

States or Territories	Representation	Arms, equipments, and camp purposes	Promotion of rifle practice	Total apportionment
Alabama	11	$32,275.96	$10,758.65	$43,034.61
Arkansas	9	26,407.61	8,802.53	35,210.14
California	10	29,341.78	9,780.59	39,122.37
Colorado	5	14,670.89	4,890.30	19,561.19
Connecticut	7	20,539.24	6,846.42	27,385.66
Delaware	3	8,802.53	2,934.18	11,736.71
Florida	5	14,670.89	4,890.30	19,561.19
Georgia	13	38,144.31	12,714.77	50,859.08
Idaho	3	8,802.53	2,934.18	11,736.71
Illinois	27	79,222.81	26,407.60	105,630.41
Indiana	15	44,012.67	14,670.89	58,683.56
Iowa	13	38,244.31	12,714.77	50,859.08
Kansas	10	29,341.78	9,780.59	39,122.37
Kentucky	13	38,144.31	12,714.77	50,859.08
Louisiana	9	26,407.61	8,802.53	35,210.14
Maine	6	17,605.07	5,868.35	23,473.42
Maryland	8	23,473.42	7,824.48	31,297.90
Massachusetts	16	46,946.85	15,648.95	62,595.80
Michigan	14	41,078.49	13,692.83	54,771.32
Minnesota	11	32,275.96	10,758.65	43,034.61
Mississippi	10	29,341.78	9,780.59	39,122.37
Missouri	18	52,815.20	17,605.07	70,420.27
Montana	3	8,802.53	2,934.18	11,736.71
Nebraska	8	23,473.42	7,824.48	31,297.90
Nevada	3	8,802.53	2,934.18	11,736.71
New Hampshire	4	11,736.71	3,912.24	15,648.95
New Jersey	12	35,210.14	11,736.71	46,946.85
New York	39	114,432.94	38,144.31	152,577.25
North Carolina	12	35,210.14	11,736.71	46,946.85
North Dakota	4	11,736.71	3,912.24	15,648.95
Ohio	23	67,486.10	22,495.36	89,981.46
Oklahoma	7	20,539.24	6,846.42	27,385.66
Oregon	4	11,736.71	3,912.24	15,648.95
Pennsylvania	34	99,762.05	33,254.02	133,016.07
Rhode Island	4	11,736.71	3,912.24	15,648.95
South Carolina	9	26,407.61	8,802.53	35,210.14
South Dakota	4	11,736.71	3,912.24	15,648.95
Tennessee	12	35,210.14	11,736.71	46,946.85
Texas	18	52,815.20	17,605.07	70,420.27
Utah	3	8,802.53	2,934.18	11,736.71
Vermont	4	11,736.71	3,912.24	15,648.95
Virginia	12	35,210.14	11,736.71	46,946.85
Washington	5	14,670.89	4,890.30	19,561.19
West Virginia	7	20,539.24	6,846.42	27,385.66
Wisconsin	13	38,144.31	12,714.77	50,859.08
Wyoming	3	8,802.53	2,934.18	11,736.71
Arizona	....	8,490.47	2,830.14	11,320.61
District of Columbia	....	27,803.16	9,267.72	37,070.88
Hawaii	....	11,041.87	3,680.62	14,722.49
New Mexico	....	7,706.56	2,568.85	10,275.41
Division of Militia Affairs and Nat. Mi. Board	....	.....	.....	37,000.00
Total	483	$1,472,250.00	$490,750.00	$2,000,000.00

The law requires that the annual appropriation of $2,000,000 shall be apportioned among the several states, under the direction of the secretary of war, according to the number of senators and representatives to which the state is entitled in the Congress of the United States, and to the territories and the District of Columbia such proportion and under such regulations as the President may prescribe, provided that no state shall be entitled to the benefit of the appropriation apportioned to it unless the number of its regularly enlisted. organized, and uniformed active militia shall be one hundred men for each senator and representative to which such state is entitled in the Congress of the United States.

The funds are available for expenditure for the following purposes:

For any stores and supplies or publications which are supplied to the army.

For the payment, subsistence, and transportation of such portions of the Organized Militia as shall engage in actual field or camp service for instruction.

For the actual excess of expenses of travel incurred by officers of the Regular Army in connection with the inspections of the Organized Militia, over the authorized mileage allowances of said officers in traveling under War Department orders.

For the promotion of rifle practice, including the acquisition, construction, maintenance, and equipment of shooting galleries and suitable target ranges.

For the hire of horses and draft animals for the

use of mounted troops, batteries, and wagons in connection with field exercises for instructional purposes.

For forage for horses and draft animals in connection with field exercises and instructional purposes.

For such incidental expenses as may be deemed necessary by the secretary of war, in connection with encampments, maneuvers, and field instruction, and for the same in connection with joint maneuvers or exercises with regular troops.

The following table gives the number of militia in the United States under the Dick Bill in 1910.

Official Designation of the Organized Militia	Total Commissioned	Enlisted Men	Tot'l Commis'd and Enlisted (Org'ized Militia)	Reserve Militia (Unorganized)
Alabama National Guard	240	3,134	3,374	350,000
National Guard of Arizona	48	568	616	40,000
Arkansas National Guard	136	1,534	1,670	325,000
National Guard of California	199	2,777	2,976	309,546
National Guard of Colorado	76	887	963	131,000
Connecticut National Guard	180	2,441	2,621	124,991
Organized Militia of Delaware	44	336	380	32,000
National Guard of District of Columbia	115	1,664	1,779	62,634
Florida State Troops	101	1,177	1,278	264,335
National Guard of Georgia	237	2,686	2,923	500,000
National Guard of Hawaii	47	572	619	8,000
National Guard of Idaho	57	560	617	30,000
Illinois National Guard	520	5,746	6,266	1,031,488
Indiana National Guard	179	2,106	2,285	638,560
Iowa National Guard	223	2,664	2,887	302,000
Kansas National Guard	133	1,565	1,698	350,000
Kentucky State Guard	140	1,712	1,852	336,000
Louisiana State National Board	127	1,692	1,819	400,000
National Guard of the State of Maine	116	1,266	1,382	103,375
Maryland National Guard	157	1,944	2,101	180,000
Massachusetts Volunteer Militia	442	5,403	5,845	533,264
Michigan National Guard	203	2,703	2,906	705,000
Minnesota National Guard	207	2,598	2,805	221,000
Mississippi National Guard	141	1,422	1,563	325,000
National Guard of Missouri	254	3,262	3,516	650,000
National Guard of Montana	42	515	557	37,000
Nebraska National Guard	117	953	1,070	130,000
Nevada National Guard	.....	.....	.....	19,000
New Hampshire National Guard	89	1,154	1,243	40,000
National Guard of New Jersey	360	3,955	4,315	559,456
National Guard of New Mexico	55	711	766	68,000
National Guard of New York	994	15,295	16,289	1,436,275
North Carolina National Guard	221	2,174	2,395	290,000
North Dakota National Guard	70	678	748	60,000
Ohio National Guard	517	5,776	6,293	1,085,110
Oklahoma National Guard	59	898	957	140,000
Oregon National Guard	112	1,411	1,523	130,000
National Guard of Pennsylvania	722	9,558	10,280	1,081,845
Rhode Island National Guard	109	989	1,098	90,000
National Guard of South Carolina	183	1,748	1,931	213,274
South Dakota National Guard	76	690	766	70,000
National Guard of Tennessee	131	1,409	1,540	425,000
Texas National Guard	220	2,804	3,024	500,000
National Guard of Utah	50	387	437	30,000
Vermont National Guard	67	850	917	46,500
Virginia Volunteers	187	2,311	2,498	250,000
National Guard of Washington	78	929	1,007	200,000
West Virginia National Guard	107	1,280	1,387	175,000
Wisconsin National Guard	192	2,888	3,080	438,472
Wyoming National Guard	51	665	716	25,000
	9,133	112,447	121,580	15,493,125

The Militia Law of January 21, 1903, as amended by the act of May 27, 1908, provides, "That the militia shall consist of every able-bodied male citizen of the respective states, who is more than eighteen and less than forty-five years of age, and shall be divided into two classes — the Organized Militia, to be known as the National Guard, or by such other designations as may be given them by the laws of the respective states or territories; the remainder to be known as the Reserve Militia."

Alaska has no militia, though provision is made for such if need arises. Guam and Samoa have each a small provisional force, used more for police purposes than for military. The Philippines have a constabulary force which can be used either for war or police purposes, provided the former is on the islands. Porto Rico has a regiment of eight companies of infantry which is a part of the Regular Army. The enlisted men and over one-half of the line officers of this regiment are natives of Porto Rico. The reserve militia in the Southern States is assumed to include negroes capable of bearing arms.

The strength and organization of the Regular Army in active service as organized under the acts of Congress comprises fifteen regiments of cavalry, 765 officers and 12,775 enlisted men; six regiments of field artillery, 236 officers and 5,220 enlisted men, a coast artillery corps, one hundred and seventy companies, 672 officers and 19,321 enlisted men; thirty regiments of infantry, 1,530 officers and 25,231 enlisted men;

three battalions of engineers, 2,002 enlisted men, commanded by officers detailed from the corps of engineers, the Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry, thirty-two officers and 576 enlisted men; staff corps, Service School detachments, Military Academy, Indian scouts, recruits, etc., 11,777 enlisted men, and a provisional force of fifty-two companies of native scouts in the Philippines, 180 officers and 5,732 enlisted men. The total number of commissioned officers, staff and line on the active list is 4,453 (including 193 first lieutenants, Medical Reserve Corps on active duty), and the total enlisted strength, staff and line is 76,911, exclusive of the provisional force and the hospital corps. The law provides that the total enlisted strength of the army shall not exceed at any one time 100,000.

RETURN TO ⟶ CIRCULATION DEPARTMENT
202 Main Library

LOAN PERIOD 1 HOME USE	2	3
4	5	6

ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS
1-month loans may be renewed by calling 642-3405
6-month loans may be recharged by bringing books to Circulation Desk
Renewals and recharges may be made 4 days prior to due date

DUE AS STAMPED BELOW

DEC 7 1980 .13
RECEIVED BY
NOV 24 1980
CIRCULATION DEPT.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY
FORM NO. DD6, 60m, 3/80 BERKELEY, CA 94720

50m-8,'26

YC 02627

334254

WA42
P8

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY